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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent and comprehensive report assessing the juvenile justice
system in Illinois concludes that the quality of the representation of
children in delinquencyl proceedings falls well short of national
standards2 and that the "juvenile indigent defense system is in urgent
need of attention and repair." 3 This conclusion is somewhat surprising
since, historically, Illinois has been thought to be at the forefront in the
creation of a "fair and equitable juvenile justice system."4 Yet, in recent
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1. A delinquent act is an act committed by a minor that would be considered a crime if
committed by an adult. SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW
446 (4th ed. 2011).
2. CATHRYN CRAWFORD, BERNARDtNE DOHRN, THOMAS F. GERAGHTY, MARJORIE B. Moss
& PATRICIA PURITZ, ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2007) [hereinafter ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT
REPORT], available at http://www.state.il.us/defender/acrobatdocs/jreport.pdf. This report is the
result of "The Illinois Juvenile Defense Assessment Project," which was created by the Children
and Family Justice Center of the Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern School of Law after it
received a grant from the MacArthur Foundation Models for Change initiative. Id. at ix-x. As
the report explains, "The project set out to conduct an independent assessment of juvenile defense
practices across Illinois as a predicate for improving and enhancing the legal representation
received by children in conflict with the law." Id. at 12. The goal of the assessment is to examine
the scope and quality of legal representation of accused children in juvenile courts throughout
Illinois and to provide recommendations aimed at strengthening the quality of defender services
for these children. Id. The assessment examines "systemic and institutional barriers that impede
a lawyer's ability to provide effective legal representation to indigent children within the Illinois
juvenile justice system, while also documenting strengths and promising juvenile defense
practices." Id.
3. Id. at 7 1.
4. Id. at 1. In fact, the report states "[fjrom the inception of the world's first juvenile court
over 100 years ago [in Chicago] ... Illinois has historically been a place where new ideas and
strategies that impact children and families have been born, tested and refined. . . ." Id at 1.
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years, the juvenile justice system in the state has been characterized by
numerous problems, including untimely appointment of counsel,
inappropriate use of plea bargaining, confusion over the role of counsel,
lack of zealous advocacy, inadequate resources, and incomplete data
and information.5
Some of these problems are similar to those of the analogous adult
criminal justice system and many can probably be adequately addressed
by providing more resources and better supervision of the system.
There is one particular problem, however, that is unique to the juvenile
justice system. It is different in character because it is the result of a
profound misunderstanding by courts and lawyers as to the function of
attorneys in delinquency proceedings and because it is based on a
flawed statutory scheme that, while supposedly designed to protect the
rights of juveniles, actually operates to threaten them and to damage the
credibility of the juvenile justice system. 6
For these reasons, this particular problem can only be addressed by a
fundamental change in the approach to the concept of juvenile justice as
recognized in Illinois. This problem is the continuing confusion over
the role of counsel in delinquency proceedings, particularly between the
role of an attorney and the role of a guardian ad litem.
5. Id. at 2-5.
6. AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENGLAND JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR.,
MAINE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 (2003) [hereinafter MAINE ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf (stating that conflicting approaches to the role of a minor's
attorney in juvenile delinquency proceedings damages the credibility of the juvenile justice
system).
7. It should be noted that the problem is not unique to Illinois. AM. BAR Ass'N JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 26 (1995) [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE],
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf ("[D]esire to 'help' children, sometimes at the
expense of good legal claims, reflects profound confusion about the lawyer's ethical duty to
juvenile clients. Although ethical and legal standards call for attorneys to represent children as
zealously as they would adults," sometimes children's attorneys "abandon adversarial efforts in
paternalistic deference to the court's efforts to intervene in the child's life."). There are a number
of assessment studies just like the one conducted in Illinois that point to the same problem in
other states. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. CALVIN, AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL.,
WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
JUVENILE OFFENDER MATTERS 3 (2003) [hereinafter WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT REPORT],
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/wareport.pdf ("There is confusion and disagreement about
the role of juvenile defenders in Washington and, as a result, important opportunities to
effectively counsel and represent the interest of the child are lost."); TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR
DEFENSE PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT:
JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 24 (2000) [hereinafter TEXAS ASSESSMENT REPORT],
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf (quoting a defense counsel as saying:
"[My first task is] to get these kids help. If they don't agree with me, I don't care. I know what is
in their best interest better than their parents do."); AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. &
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MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 32 (Elizabeth
Cumming et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter MARYLAND ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf ("Many public defenders did not appear to understand the
critical role of defense counsel in providing zealous advocacy through an express interest model
of representation."); ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE & KIM BROOKS TANDY, NAT'L JUVENILE
DEFENDER CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 40 (2006)
[hereinafter INDIANA ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Indiana%20
Assessment.pdf (finding that one of the systemic barriers to effective representation in
delinquency proceedings in the state is the misperception about the role of counsel as a guardian
rather than as an advocate); AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & SO. JUVENILE DEFENDER
CENTER, NORTH CAROLINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 39 (Lynn Grindall et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf ("As a result of this confusion about counsel's role, many
juveniles [do] not appear to be clear about who was representing them."); PATRICIA PURITZ ET
AL., NAT'L JUVENILLE DEFENDER CTR., MISSISSiPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL
AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 42 (2007) [hereinafter
MISSISSIPPI ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi
assessment.pdf ("Many juvenile defenders believe . . . that their role is to protect the 'best
interests' of the child, not to assume an adversarial role in which they protect the legal interests of
their clients."); AM. BAR Ass'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING
JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 33 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter KENTUCKY
ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/KentuckyAssessment.pdf (noting
significant discrepancies regarding representation in delinquency proceedings, particularly the
fact that in some counties assigned counsel were actually guardians ad litem assigned from the
court's roster of attorneys used in dependency, neglect and abuse cases); MAINE ASSESSMENT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (identifying as a concern the systemic pressure for juvenile defenders
to act in the best interest of the child, sometimes in opposition to their role as zealous advocates,
that various judges interviewed affirmed that juvenile defenders' first duty is to consider the best
interests of the child rather than acting as zealous advocates, and that zealous advocacy on legal
grounds is not favored); AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., MONTANA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 40 (Brock Albin et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter MONTANA ASSESSMENT REPORT],
available at http://www.njdc.info/ pdf/mtreport.pdf (identifying confusion among participants in
the juvenile court system over whether the role of public defenders is to protect the "best
interests" of the child and reported that judges seem to want public defenders to be advocates for
the system rather that advocates for their clients); JESSIE BECK, PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN
WALKER STERLING, NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUVENILE LEGAL DEFENSE: A REPORT
ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN IN NEBRASKA 54
(2009) [hereinafter NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/
nebraska assessment.pdf ("[D]efense attorneys across the state showed that they erroneously
thought that their role was to act in the client's best interest."); AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN
OHIO 26 (Kim Brooks et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter OHIO ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/ pdflOhioAssessment.pdf ("[O]ne of the most disturbing trends noted by
investigators and in survey data was the lack of clarity regarding the attorney's role in juvenile
delinquency proceedings."); MARY ANN SCALI, JI SEON SONG & PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT'L
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., SOUTH CAROLINA JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE: A REPORT ON
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 21-
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The confusion originates in the fact that, as it relates to juvenile
justice, there are three possible lawyering models but not a consistent
approach as to which one should apply to attorneys who represent
juveniles in delinquency proceedings.8  The three models can be
described as follows: the "expressed interests lawyer or advocate,"
whose role is to advocate for the minor client's expressed interests, the
"best interest lawyer or guardian," whose role is to substitute the
lawyer's judgment for that of the minor client and to advocate for what
the lawyer decides are the best interests of the minor, and the "judicially
designated investigator," whose role is "to serve as the eyes and ears of
the appointing authority, to gather information to share with the court,
and to aid in making judicial decisions affecting the disposition of the
22, 51 (2010) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/southcarolinaassessment.pdf (noting that juvenile defenders and other
court personnel across the state are unclear or have not accepted the proper role of the attorney in
delinquency proceedings; ethical and role confusion leaves far too many children defenseless);
see also A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra, at 26 (stating that many of those who represent children do
not understand their ethical obligations, and as a result, fail to zealously represent their young
clients); NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ENCOURAGING JUDGES TO SUPPORT ZEALOUS
DEFENSE ADVOCACY FROM DETENTION TO POST-DISPOSITION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT
JUDGES 3 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ ncjfcj fact sheet.pdf ("Many juvenile
justice practitioners mistakenly believe that juvenile defenders are obliged to argue for a child's
'best interests' in court."); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children
in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592, 592 (2006)
("[O]ften well-meaning professionals and systems sometimes substitute their own interests or
ideas about what children need for the wisdom of the children and their families, and provide
solutions that are neither welcome nor responsive to the need."); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of
the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 799-800 (2010) (identifying "persistence of best-interest
representation" as one of the factors that contributes to inadequate representation unique to
juvenile court); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and
the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 266-67 (2005)
(pointing out that in Ohio "judges routinely appoint advocates to serve in delinquency cases as
'attorney/guardian ad litem,' notwithstanding statutes that require appointment of 'counsel' in
those proceedings," that in Vermont a statute allows the appointment of either a guardian ad litem
or counsel, and that the statutes in several other states confuse the role of counsel); Diane
Somberg, Defining the Role of Law Guardian in New York State by Statute, Standards and Case
Law, 19 TOURO L. REV. 529, 529 (2003) ("Confusion is generated by the fact that New York
attempts to combine several traditional roles into one entitled 'law guardian."').
8. See generally Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics ofEmpowerment: Rethinking The Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1658
(1996) (summarizing current lawyering models and arguing that the empowerment perspective is
the best model when the attorney-client relationship involves a client that is a child); Henning,
supra note 7, at 250-51 (discussing scholarly commentary soon after the Supreme Court's
decision in In re Gault regarding the role of counsel at the various stages of delinquency
proceedings, some of which argued that "counsel's obligations to the client should be the same in
adult and juvenile matters," while some argued that "best-interest advocacy was justified by the
inherent difference between the rehabilitative goals of juvenile court and the deterrent-retributive
focus of criminal courts").
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child."9 The term "guardian ad litem" is often used interchangeably to
refer to either of the last two models.' 0
Since the publication of the American Bar Association's Juvenile
Justice Standards," which explicitly called for client-directed,
expressed interest advocacy at all phases of delinquency proceedings,
most organizations that set advocacy standards for juvenile defenders
have emphasized the duty of lawyers to represent the client's expressed
interests and not to advocate for some other person's determination of
the juvenile's best interests, whether that person is a parent, a social
worker, a judge, or a lawyer.12  However, this emphasis has not
necessarily resulted in a uniform approach to juvenile delinquency
proceedings.
Thus, although in theory there is agreement that attorneys should
advocate for the client's expressed interests, there is evidence to suggest
that juvenile justice systems around the country operate based on
representation of the best interest model. In Illinois in particular, there
is significant evidence that there is confusion among attorneys and
judges who regularly participate in juvenile proceedings as to the proper
role of attorneys who represent minors. 13 In fact, the governing statute
9. The judicially designated investigator is a type of guardian ad litem used in some
jurisdictions to serve as a reporter to the court. Bruce Boyer, Report of the Working Group on
Confidentiality, 64 FpRDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1374 (1996); see also Somberg, supra note 7, at
529-30 (comparing 'the guardian ad litem, the attorney as advocate, and the attorney as
investigator of the court). At least one commentator has objected to having guardians ad litem
operate as agents for the court. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents:
Implications for Role;Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1817-18 (1996)
(arguing that guardians ad litem "should be expected to perform the same functions in litigation
as children's parents would perform").
10. Somberg, supra note 7, at 529 ("[C]onfusion is generated by the fact that New York
attempts to combine several traditional roles into one entitled 'law guardian."').
11. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH 75-76 (Robert E. Shepherd Jr. ed., 1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesI/ojjdp/166773.pdf.
12. AM. BAR Ass'N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR
PRIVATE PARTIES §§ 3.1(a), 9.4(a) (1979), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/
83582.pdf; Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference
in Juvenile Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959, 967 (2010) (citing Henning, supra note 7, at 255-
56); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 86-90 (1984) (calling for a client-directed
focus when children are old enough to provide effective guidance to attorney); Ellen Marrus, Best
Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for
Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 294 (2003).
13. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court-A Promise
Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 409 (2008) (suggesting that although there is
agreement that attorneys should advocate for the client's expressed interests, there is also
evidence to suggest that juvenile justice systems around the country operate based on
representation of the best interest model). Additionally, the Illinois Assessment Report points out
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in Illinoisl 4 has been interpreted to allow an attorney to act as an
attorney and a guardian ad litem simultaneously.15  In the end, as a
result of the confusion about an attorney's role within the juvenile
justice system, attorneys may end up acting contrary to their ethical
duties or providing ineffective assistance of counsel.16
Regardless of whether there is still some debate as to the true nature
of juvenile delinquency proceedings, given that the stakes for minors
participating in those proceedings are higher than ever before, it should
be recognized that juveniles are empowered to make important
decisions about their participation in the legal system.17  This, in turn,
makes having access to quality legal representation critical. Thus,
assuming that the minors are old enough to express their own interests,
it should follow that courts should never allow an attorney to serve as an
attorney and as a guardian ad litem at the same time. Instead, courts
should demand that attorneys representing minors in delinquency
proceedings act as advocates for their clients, representing their
legitimate expressed interests as developed by the minor clients in
consultation with their lawyers' 8 and not some abstract "best interest"
that "[m]any judges contribute to the muddled perception of the role of counsel in delinquency
court." ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 63. Judges often had differing
perspectives on the appropriate role of attorneys-a judge in a large county, for example,
criticized the public defenders that appear in his courtroom who "focus too much on defense but
not enough on best interests." Id. Similarly, a judge in a small rural county noted that defense
counsel "can be in a 'difficult position' at times because parents want to 'beat the rap' rather than
do what is in the 'best interest' of the child. Id. In addition, because of the confusion of the role
of attorneys in the juvenile justice system, many of the attorneys representing minors "struggle
mightily every day to remain zealous advocates" and some "succumb to the notion that the
juvenile defense attorney plays an insignificant role in juvenile court." Id. at 5-6.
14. Juvenile Court Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5 (2010).
15. The Act states that "[u]nless the guardian ad litem is an attorney, [the minor] shall be
represented by counsel." Id. § 610(2). For the two most recent instances where courts interpreted
the statute, see In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) and In re Austin M, 941
N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
16. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 978 n.95 ("[N]ational and state assessments of juvenile
defender systems demonstrate that 'performance standards and ethical rules appear to be honored
mostly in the breach."' (quoting Fedders, supra note 7, at 771, 792)).
17. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1423 (1996) (arguing that the policy expressed in In re Gault
supports the conclusion that children possess the same autonomy rights that adult criminal
defendants enjoy and that "young children are empowered to set the objectives of their criminal
case to the same degree as an unimpaired adult").
18. As shall be discussed further below, this view is also consistent with the attorney's duties
under rules of professional conduct. See infra Part IV; see also Federle, supra note 8, at 1674-75
(citing Am. BAR Ass'N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 12, § 3.1(b)(ii)[a]); Samuel M.
Davis, The Role of the Attorney in Child Advocacy, 32 J. FAM. L. 817, 830 (1994)
("[R]epresenting the best interests of the child means what the child feels are his or her best
interests, rather than what the attorney believes the child's best interest to be."); Guggenheim,
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determined by having the attorney substitute his or her judgment for that
of the client. 19
Because minors involved in delinquency proceedings are entitled to
the right to counsel,20 it is imperative to abandon the approach to
juvenile justice that allows the possibility of representation by an
attorney who also acts as a guardian ad litem, or, stated in a different
way, by an attorney who simply pursues what the attorney believes to
be the best interests of his or her minor client. Minors involved in
delinquency proceedings will benefit greatly from the adoption of a
system that requires that different individuals perform the roles of
attorneys and guardians.
This Article will explore some of the many reasons that support this
conclusion. Part II will provide a short history and description of the
juvenile justice system in Illinois. 21 Part III will discuss the right to
counsel under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act and the continuing
confusion regarding the attorney's role in delinquency proceedings. 22
Part IV will describe the proper role for an attorney in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. 23  Part V will discuss the negative
consequences of the confusion between the roles of attorneys and
supra note 12, at 87 (arguing that the rehabilitative nature of delinquency proceedings
necessitates furtherance of the child's own interest); Daniel L. Skoler, The Right to Counsel and
the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43 IND. L.J. 558, 580 (1968) (noting that
where the interests of the parents and child diverge, counsel should lean towards representing the
juvenile's interests); George L. Lyon Jr., Comment, Ethical Obligations of Defense Counsel in
the Juvenile Court, 3 J. JUV. L. 135, 147 (1979) (discussing how a lawyer's representation of a
juvenile in delinquency proceedings should be analogous to the lawyer's representation of a
defendant in a criminal trial).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The argument can be made that the issue is
different in cases where the children are unable to express their opinions as to their own interests.
Given the ages of children typically involved in delinquency cases, however, this is more
common in abuse and neglect or custody cases. It has been argued, for example, "It is a mistake
to try to develop a single lawyer role for children in child welfare cases which tries to
accommodate their developing capacities from infants to articulate teens. The older child needs a
traditional attorney; the youngest child, incapable of directing counsel, needs a substitute to
define and advocate for his or her best interests." Donald N. Duquette, Two Distinct Roles/Bright
Line Test, 6 NEV. L.J. 1240, 1240 (2006). This line of argument also notes that:
Trying to define a single lawyer role for children of all ages and all capacities is an
impossible task. A better approach . . . would be to adopt a bright line age test, say at
seven. At age seven (or eight or ten) and above the youth would receive a client
directed advocate, that is, a child's attorney, and below the bright-line age a child gets
a best interests (or substituted judgment) advocate.
Id. (emphasis in original)
20. Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170 (2010).
21. See infra Part II (discussing the juvenile justice system in Illinois).
22. See infra Part III (exploring the attorney's role in delinquency proceedings).
23. See infra Part IV (arguing that an attorney cannot maintain an attorney-client relationship
and serve as a guardian ad litem).
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guardians ad litem.24 Part VI will discuss whether the approach
currently used by the courts is justified.25 Finally, Part VII will propose
a solution to the problem. 26
II. THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
Historically, Illinois has been thought to be at the forefront in the
creation of a fair and equitable juvenile justice system.27  In 1899,
Chicago became the site of the first separate juvenile court in the United
States, which transformed the national approach to the legal needs of
children.28 Influenced by the Chicago model, by 1925 forty-six states,
three territories, and the District of Columbia had created separate
juvenile courts.29
As originally instituted, the juvenile court system was created
following a reform movement to protect children rather than to punish
them.30 Before this reform movement, children were subject to severe
punishment and incarceration with adult criminals. Reformers sought to
treat children differently. The new juvenile tribunals were to be kind
places designed to take care of children rather than to judge them.3 '
The system was designed to hold minors accountable for their anti-
social conduct but was not based on the criminalization of that
conduct.32  The goal of the system was to provide support and
rehabilitation rather than punishment, and its procedures were designed
24. See infra Part V (outlining the problems with the current confusion between the roles of
attorneys and guardians ad litem).
25. See infra Part VI (rejecting current justifications for permitting both roles).
26. See infra Part VII (proposing that eliminating the guardian ad litem role will solve the
problem at hand).
27. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
28. Id. at ix; RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 452; Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1191-92 (1970) (citing Illinois
Juvenile Court Act, § 1, 1899 Ill. Laws 131-32 (repealed 1965)).
29. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at ix.
30. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 452. Some, however, advance the alternative,
although not mutually exclusive theory, that the reform was based on an attempt to regulate the
behavior of the children of lower class immigrant families. Id. at 453.
31. Marvin Ventrell, The Practice ofLaw For Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y, 75,
86 (2006) (noting that reformers were "moved by the plight of poor children and sought to save
them from their circumstances by removing them from their environment" and by creating an
especially kind tribunal "which would care for children ... as the parens patriae"); see also
RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 452 (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV.
L. REV. 104, 107 (1909)) (stating that juvenile courts should treat juvenile offenders "as a wise
and merciful father handles his own child").
32. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 970 ("Juvenile courts were originally designed over a century
ago to be forums for the rehabilitation of youth, rather than the vehicle by which young offenders
would be punished.").
840 [Vol. 43
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to be more informal than those of criminal trials. For this reason,
minors were rarely represented by attorneys and their rights were
thought to be better served by allowing adults to decide what the
minors' best interests 33 would be within the court's civil jurisdiction.34
This view is exemplified by an article written by a prominent leader in
the juvenile reform movement in 1909, which stated that:
The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are out of place in [juvenile
delinquency] hearings. . . . Seated at a desk, with the child at his side,
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw
the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will
gain immensely in its effectiveness of his work.35
This approach, however, has changed dramatically over the years. 36
One reason for the change, most likely, was the realization that juvenile
delinquency proceedings have more in common with criminal justice
proceedings than with civil cases. A civil jurisdiction approach is
understandable in abuse and neglect cases where the children are
victims and the court is seeking ways to protect them from harm.37
However, in delinquency cases the court is looking to evaluate the
33. Id. at 970-71.
34. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 456-57 (explaining that the original juvenile court
delinquency procedure was defined, among other things, by informal procedures within the
court's civil jurisdiction); Ventrell, supra note 31, at 87-88 (stating that based on the philosophy
of the child savers, "the juvenile courts throughout the country operated for a half century as
largely process-less tribunals").
35. Mack, supra note 31, at 120; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME,
REPORT ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CONSULTANT'S PAPERS 3 (1967) (arguing that lawyers were
unnecessary and that adversary tactics were out of place).
36. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1971) ("[T]he fond and idealistic hopes
of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been
realized."); see also RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 458 ("Public pressure has led
legislatures to embrace a more punitive model that resembles the adult criminal process").
37. Other jurisdictions that allow attorneys to perform a dual role do so more commonly only
in custody or abuse and neglect proceedings. See, e.g., In re J.K., 656 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Neb.
2003) (stating that the juvenile code recognizes that roles of a guardian ad litem and counsel can
be carried out by same lawyer except for special reasons); In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d 770,
777 (W. Va. 2006) (holding that if a child's wishes are adverse to child's best interests in abuse
and neglect proceedings, they simply cannot be followed). For an argument in support of
assigning an attorney to serve as attorney and as guardian ad litem simultaneously in child
protection proceedings, see Robert F. Harris, A Response to the Recommendations of the UNLV
Conference: Another Look at the Attorney/Guarding Ad Litem Model, 6 NEV. L.J. 1284, 1289
(2006), in which the author concludes that the an appointment as attorney and guardian ad litem
allows the attorney to advance his or her clients' best interests as well as to act as their lawyers
and that, "[w]hile this dual capacity presents challenges, it allows for the most effective and
efficient representation of children in child protection proceedings." According to this author, the
two roles inform each other, and only rarely present unmanageable conflicts. Id.; see also
RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 455-56.
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conduct of the children in order to impose some level of punishment,
which can result in imprisonment.
For this reason, beginning with a series of decisions starting in the
1960s, the United States Supreme Court began to eliminate much of the
distinction between juvenile proceedings and criminal trials.38 To begin
with, the Supreme Court decided that minors in delinquency
proceedings must be accorded due process guarantees comparable to
those provided to adult criminal defendants. 39 This was a reaction to
the traditional informality of juvenile court procedures where due
process and assistance of counsel were thought to be obstacles to the
goals of juvenile courts. 40
Once the Court decided juveniles were owed due process, it was not
long before it decided they were owed the right to assistance of counsel.
Thus, in In re Gault, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees minors the right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings.41 Concerned about the lack of due process in
the juvenile system, the Court asserted that "the condition of being a
38. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979) (holding that Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination applies in the juvenile context if, after reviewing the totality of
circumstances, the child did not waive his or her Miranda rights); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
535-36 (1975) (finding that the constitutional protection of double jeopardy does not diminish the
informality and flexibility inherent in juvenile court proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
359, 366 (1970) (finding that juvenile delinquency proceedings are governed by the evidentiary
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is an "essential of due process and fair
treatment"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights govern juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as they do criminal proceedings);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (finding that in waiver proceedings in Juvenile
Court, a child is afforded substantially the same rights as criminal defendants, including a hearing
and assistance of counsel); ROBIN WALKER STERLING, ROLE OF JUVENILE DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DELINQUENCY COURT 1 (2009), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/role-of juveniledefense
counsel.pdf (remarking that beginning in 1966, the aforementioned cases "extended bedrock
elements of due process to youth charged in delinquency proceedings").
39. See Kent, 383 U.S at 563-65 (invalidating a juvenile court order transferring a teenager to
criminal court); see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-101(l)(d), (3) (2006) (requiring all
procedures in the juvenile justice system to comport with the constitutional rights due to criminal
defendants, unless specifically provided otherwise).
40. STERLING, supra note 38, at 2 ("[I]ntroduction of advocates to the juvenile court system
was meant . .. to infuse the informal juvenile court process with more of the jealously-guarded
constitutional protections of adult criminal court and their attendant adversarial tenor.");
Katherine R. Kruse, Standing in Babylon, Looking Toward Zion, 6 NEV. L.J. 1315, 1318 (2006)
("[R]ight to adversary counsel in delinquency cases was established in a surge of realism about
the widespread failure of juvenile courts to live up to their rehabilitative ideals.").
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. The Court emphasized that providing legal representation for
minors in delinquency proceedings was necessary to assure due process asserting that "no ...
action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court than
provision of counsel." Id. at 38 n.65.
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boy does not justify a kangaroo court"42 and also recognized that minors
have the right to written notice of the charges against them, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to appeal, and the
protection provided by the right against self-incrimination. 43  In
addition, a few years later, the Court held that minors' guilt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt" and that a delinquency proceeding
triggers the protection against double jeopardy.4 5  Most recently, the
Court also extended the protections of the so-called "Miranda rights" to
juveniles.46
Given this line of cases, it can be argued that the Supreme Court's
approach supports the view that juvenile delinquency proceedings are
analogous to criminal trials and that attempts to distinguish juvenile
delinquency proceedings from criminal trials by calling them "non
adversarial" 47  would not exempt them from the application of
Constitutional guarantees. The Court explicitly stated this notion in
1970 when holding that "civil labels and good intentions do not
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in
juvenile courts."48
In Illinois, the development of the law and the practice of that law in
juvenile courts have followed a similar path. Over the years, the
juvenile court system that had originally been created to provide a non-
criminal avenue for rehabilitation of juveniles has become much more
like a criminal trial system for young defendants. 4 9 This is particularly
true since 1998 when the Illinois General Assembly adopted changes to
42. Id at 28; Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in
Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 301 (1998)
("Nearly everyone would identify 1967 as the most important year in the history of counsel for
children in the United States.").
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 47-49, 58.
44. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
45. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-36, 538 (1975).
46. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (reversing the lower court's
holding that a minor was not entitled to a Miranda warning because children will often feel bound
to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would understand he or
she is free to leave).
47. In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d 588, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (deeming juvenile delinquency
proceedings non-adversarial in the traditional sense); In re Austin M. 941 N.E.2d 903, 917 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010) (asserting that juvenile delinquency proceeding are not as adversarial as
traditional, criminal proceedings).
48. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-66. The Court, however, has not been entirely consistent
on this point when it comes to the issue of whether juveniles should have the right to a jury in
juvenile proceedings. Id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting). In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court found that "juvenile court proceeding[s] ha[ve] not yet been held to be a 'criminal
prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment." 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
49. ILLINOis ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
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the Illinois Juvenile Court Act-changes that even the Illinois Supreme
Court has admitted make the juvenile delinquency adjudicatory process
more punitive and more criminal in nature.5 0
The result of those amendments was a new statute that "represents a
fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the
overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile
offenders accountable for violations of the law" 51 and that make the
statute more like a penal statute that should be strictly construed in
favor of the accused.52 As adopted, the changes expanded the
conditions under which a minor could be transferred to an adult court,
shifted the focus from the needs of the child to the nature of the alleged
offense, 53 mandated that some children would be committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice until the age of twenty-one, 54 expanded
access to and sharing of a child's school and court records between law
enforcement and other agencies, 55 lengthened the amount of time a
child could be held at a police station,56 and eliminated the confidential
character of a number of aspects of the proceedings.57  In addition,
minors must register as sex offenders under the Sex Offender
50. In re Jaime P., 861 N.E.2d 958, 964 (111. 2006); People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 877
N.E.2d 416, 424 (Ill. 2007); People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ill. 2006); see also In re
Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 265 (Ill. 2011) (Burke, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Juvenile Justice
Reform Provisions of 1998, along with a number of other amendments to the Juvenile Court Act
since 1999, have transformed the Act to such an extent that, for juveniles charged with criminal
offenses, juvenile proceedings are now the equivalent of a criminal prosecution.").
51. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d at 139. On the other hand, the 1998 reforms also included provisions
that appeared to attempt to achieve a more "restorative" approach to juvenile justice by
encouraging the creation of community mediation programs and diversion and intervention
programs in order to provide opportunities for minors to avoid having to appear before juvenile
court proceedings or to be transferred to adult courts. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note
2, at 23-24.
52. In re Jaime P., 861 N.E.2d at 966. The Juvenile Court Act was "radically altered" when
the General Assembly amended the Act to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of
juveniles, thus making the statute more like a penal statute that should be strictly construed in
favor of the accused. Id. at 964.
53. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (2010) (requiring that the offense be used to
determine jurisdiction); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805 (2010) (discussing transfer of
jurisdiction based on offense).
54. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-815; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-820; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-750(2).
55. See generally 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-901 (regarding confidentiality of records and
expungements).
56. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-410(c) (providing that a juvenile accused of committing
a crime of violence may be detained up to twenty-four hours in a county jail or municipal
lockup).
57. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-901(5)(a) (allowing the general public to have access to a
delinquent minor's name, address, and offense).
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Registration Act for the same period of time as adults58 and, just like
convicted adults, all minors found guilty of the commission of a felony
must provide a DNA sample to the Illinois Department of State Police
so that genetic marker grouping analysis information may be included
in adult state and national DNA databases. 59 Finally, although not as
important in terms of substance, but certainly illustrative of the trend,
even the terminology used regarding delinquency proceedings was
changed and is now almost indistinguishable from the terminology used
in criminal proceedings. 60
This shift in focus within the juvenile justice system has led
commentators, attorneys, and some justices of the Illinois Supreme
Court to conclude that the attributes of the adult criminal justice system
are already permanent features of the juvenile justice system. 6 1  For
58. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3-5. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the view
that applying sex offender registration requirements to minors does not support the conclusion
that the juvenile delinquency system has become more punitive. It has found that "requiring a
juvenile sex offender to register, and allowing very limited public access to notification
concerning the juvenile's status as a sex offender, does not constitute punishment." In re
Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 247 (Ill. 2011) (Burke, J., dissenting) (citing In re J.W., 204 111.
2d 50, 75 (2003)). It is difficult to understand how the exact same consequence is considered
punishment if applied to an adult but not if applied to a child. It is also difficult to accept that the
consequences do not constitute punishment when one considers, as argued by Justice Burke in In
re Jonathon CB., that "[w]ith registration comes the potential that restrictions will be placed on
the minor's movement (730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7 (2006)), schooling (730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
152/121 (2006)), and housing (730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/8 (2006)), as well as other societal
repercussions which could continue throughout the minor's lifetime." Id. at 266 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
59. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-3(a)(3.5) (2010). Interestingly, however, the Court has
unconvincingly tried to support the view that applying DNA collection and storage requirements
to minors should not be used to support the argument that the juvenile delinquency system has
become more punitive. It has claimed that, as applied to juveniles, DNA collection and storage
has a "deterrent and rehabilitative effect because it identifies those at risk of offending." In re
Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 579 (Ill. 2008). According to the court, this makes it consistent
with the Juvenile Court Act's purpose of rehabilitating juveniles to prevent further delinquent
behavior. This view was recently reaffirmed in In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 250. Setting
aside the doubtful assertion that collecting DNA identifies those at risk of reoffending, it is
difficult to understand how deterrence as a punishment contributes to rehabilitation in any way
that is different than when applied to adults. Id. at 265-66 (Burke, J., dissenting). In other
words, the collection of DNA adopted to inspire deterrence in juveniles is exactly the same as in
cases involving adults. Id. The fact that in one case the court is using it against a juvenile does
not make the use of the measure any less punitive. Id
60. What used to be referred to as an "adjudication hearing" is now called a "trial." An
adverse result for the juvenile at that hearing, which used to be called an "adjudication of
delinquency," is now called a "finding of guilt," which now results in another hearing called a
"sentencing hearing." In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 265 (Burke, J., dissenting); People v.
Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ill. 2006).
61. See In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 272-74 (Burke, J., dissenting) (explaining how
amendments to the Juvenile Court Act have introduced attributes of criminal proceedings to
juvenile proceedings held under the Act); In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1017 (111. 2000) (Heiple,
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example, in a dissenting opinion in a case decided in 2000, Justice
Heiple argued that:
In past decisions, this court has emphasized that delinquency
proceedings are not criminal in nature because the overriding concern
of these proceedings is rehabilitation, not punishment. . . . The prior
analysis on this issue is flawed, however, because it relied on an
outmoded characterization of the juvenile justice system. Much has
changed . . . . Rehabilitation no longer occupies its once preeminent
status in the juvenile justice system; punishment and public safety are
now the juvenile justice system's overriding concerns.6 2
Likewise, more recently, Justice Burke opined,
I believe that legislative changes to the Juvenile Court Act . . . have
placed juvenile offenders on par with adult offenders and, as a
practical matter, have resulted in a convergence of the juvenile justice
system with the adult justice system. The revisions to our Juvenile
Court Act have turned juvenile delinquency proceedings into an
adversarial system in which punishment of the minor and protection of
society are the primary goals. The protective parens patriae ideals,
which were the hallmark of the juvenile justice system . .. have given
J., dissenting) ("[M]ost attributes of the adult criminal justice system are already permanent
fixtures of the juvenile justice system."); Brief and Argument for Respondent-Appellant, In re
Austin M., (Ill. Sep. 6, 2011) (No. 111195) [hereinafter Brief for Austin M.] (arguing that since
1967, juvenile delinquency proceedings have become more punitive and less focused on
rehabilitation); Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent-
Appellant at 9, In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (No. 4-08-0435) (discussing
the 1999 amendments to the Juvenile Court Act and arguing that these amendments shifted the
focus of delinquency proceedings to "protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders
accountable" for their crimes (internal citations omitted)); ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra
note 2, at 2 (identifying the inappropriate use of plea bargaining in juvenile proceedings as one of
the major shortcomings of the Illinois juvenile justice system). Some commentators had been
arguing this even before the state supreme courts began to pay close attention to juvenile
proceedings. See Federle, supra note 8, at 1672 (citing Chester J. Antieau, Constitutional Rights
in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 387-91 (1961)) (noting that some commentators prior
to 1967 believed that "distinction between the juvenile and criminal courts . . . was not a
meaningful one and the constitutional requisites of due process mandated certain procedural
protections, including the right to counsel"); Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 550 (1957) ("If the result of an adjudication of delinquency is
substantially the same as a verdict of guilty, the youngster has been cheated of his constitutional
rights by false labeling."); Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy:
Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1160 (1968) ("Despite
attempts to purge the term 'juvenile delinquent' of pejorative implications, it has come to have as
much dramatic significance for community disapproval as the label-'criminal'-which it
replaced."); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 281
(1967) ("Because the child may on occasion be subjected to punishment as a result of a juvenile
court adjudication, it has been argued that the Constitution requires the state to provide the full
panoply of procedural safeguards normally associated with the criminal process.").
62. In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1015 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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way to a new reality-one in which juveniles are treated more like
adult criminal defendants. 63
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act itself contributes to the ongoing
debate over the true nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings. It
expresses the notion that juvenile proceedings are like criminal trials,
but it immediately undermines the strength of that statement by
implying that the state does not have to recognize all the rights
recognized in criminal trials. 64
The underlying idea behind this statement is that, although juvenile
delinquency proceedings are like criminal trials, they are not similar
enough to criminal trials to require the state to approach them in exactly
the same way it approaches criminal trials. Illinois courts, including the
Illinois Supreme Court, have been relatively consistent in expressing
this apparently inconsistent view. Courts have, thus, sometimes
63. In re Jonathon CB., 958 N.E.2d at 275 (Burke, J., dissenting). Based on this view, Justice
Burke concluded,
[W]hen a minor is charged and tried in juvenile court for having committed an offense
that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor is subject to the
possibility of being confined for more than six months, it can scarcely be denied that
the delinquency prosecution is the legal equivalent of a criminal prosecution [and that
the] right to a jury trial, granted to an accused "in criminal prosecutions" ... must
apply to juveniles.
Id.
64. The Act states that "minors shall have all the procedural rights of adults in criminal
proceedings," only to immediately qualify the statement by adding that this is only true "unless
specifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection of such minors." 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/5-101(3) (2010). Interestingly, one of the rights the Act assumes would not enhance
the protection of minors is the right to a jury trial. The Act specifically provides juveniles the
right to a jury trial in only three instances: when the juvenile is tried under the extended juvenile
jurisdiction provision; as a habitual juvenile offender; or as a violent juvenile offender. See 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810 (describing the process of extended jurisdiction for juvenile
prosecutions); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-815 (stating that a habitual juvenile offender is an
individual that has been adjudicated twice for offenses as a minor, which would have been
felonies had the child been an adult); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-820 (defining a violent
juvenile offender as one who has been adjudicated as a minor for a crime that would have been a
Class 2 or greater felony had the child been an adult). A recent attempt to declare the denial of
the right to jury trials in delinquency proceedings was rejected in In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d
at 246 (citing In re Fucini, 255 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Ill. 1970); In re Presley, 264 N.E.2d 177, 179
(Ill. 1970); In re Jones, 263 N.E.2d 863, 864 (Ill. 1970)). In In re Jonathon C.B., the court
considered whether the section of the Juvenile Court Act, which denies the right to a jury trial, is
unconstitutional. In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 238. Finding that the 1999 amendments to
the Juvenile Court Act do not render it punitive and criminal in nature, the court concluded that
there are still significant differences between juvenile proceedings and criminal trials to justify
the difference in approach. Id. at 251. Thus, it concluded that § 5-101(3) does not violate the
Illinois Constitution. Id. at 249. In dissent, Justice Burke argued that the changes to the Act have
rendered juvenile proceedings "fundamentally more criminal in nature" and, thus, that § 5-101(3)
should be held to be unconstitutional. Id at 261.
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asserted that juvenile delinquency proceedings are like criminal trials,6 5
but more often than not have taken the view that they are still
sufficiently different to justify differences in approach and in the
recognition of applicable rights.66 In People v. Taylor, for example, the
court explicitly stated that:
The policy that seeks to hold juveniles accountable for their actions
and to protect the public does not negate the concept that rehabilitation
remains a more important consideration in the juvenile justice system
than in the criminal justice system and that there are still significant
differences between the two, indicating that 'the ideal of separate
treatment of children is still worth pursuing.' 67
Also, and perhaps due to this type of ambivalence, the extent to
which states guarantee the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings
varies among jurisdictions. 68  In some states, children are guaranteed
attorneys only in certain proceedings and in some states children are
allowed to waive their right to counsel.69 In Illinois, however, all
children have the right to an attorney at every stage of juvenile court
65. See In re Jaime P., 861 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Ill. 2006) (citing People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d
134, 138 (111. 2006)) (discussing the punitive focus of the most recent amendments to the Juvenile
Court Act); People v. Giminez, 319 N.E.2d 570, 572-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that a
detention hearing is akin to an adult probable cause hearing, which requires that counsel be
appointed for minors); see also In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d at 1017 (Heiple, J., dissenting) (arguing
that most attributes of the adult criminal justice system were already permanent features of the
juvenile justice system).
66. See In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d at 275 (Burke, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Juvenile Court Act has equated juvenile criminal offenders with adult criminal offenders, and
therefore a jury trial analogous to a criminal trial should be given to juveniles).
67. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d at 141; see also In re A.G., 746 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ill. 2001) (finding
that, even though the Juvenile Court Act has been significantly amended, "proceedings under the
Act are still not criminal in nature and are to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for,
and to promote the welfare of, the minor").
68. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 513, 515 ("Thousands of juveniles are urged or
cajoled into waiving their rights without adequate representation." (quoting N. LEE COOPER,
Conveyor Belt Justice, ABA J., July 1997, at 6)).
69. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 513, 515; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
8-221(A), (H) (2011) (counsel appointed only if offense can result in detention); DEL. FAM. CT.
R. CRIM. P., 44(a) (2012) (stating that a minor can waive right to counsel); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/1-5(1) (2010) (stating that a minor has a right to be present, heard, and present evidence, as
well as the right to be represented by counsel); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B: 12 (LexisNexis
2010) (stating that the court shall appoint counsel at the time of arraignment for a minor, provided
that the minor does not have a valid waiver); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 (West 2011)
(describing that a juvenile shall have the right to counsel); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-223(A) (West
2011) (requiring the appointment of counsel in a delinquency hearing within five days of the
filing of the petition or before the commencement of the detention hearing); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 419C.200 (2011) (mandating that a the court must appoint counsel to a child in any case
in which the court would be required to appoint counsel to an adult charged with the same
offense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(2) (West 2004) (stating that children have the
right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings).
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proceedings 70 and children under the age of seventeen are not allowed
to waive their right to counsel in any proceeding.' Also, it is clear that
minors are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in proceedings
under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.72 Thus, at first sight, Illinois
appears to continue to be at the forefront of the movement to protect the
rights of minors. Unfortunately, however, the reality is quite different.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT
AND THE CONFUSION REGARDING THE ATTORNEY'S ROLE
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act provides that minors have the right to
be represented by counsel in all juvenile court proceedings. 73 However,
it also states that if a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the minor
and the guardian ad litem is a licensed attorney, "the court may not
require the appointment of counsel to represent the minor unless the
court finds that the minor's interests are in conflict with what the
guardian ad litem determines to be in the best interest of the minor."74
Although this provision appears in the section of the Act that applies
solely to abuse and neglect proceedings,7 5 and not in the section that
applies to delinquency proceedings, 76 courts have interpreted it to apply
70. Section 1-5(1) of the Act provides that "[n]o hearing on any petition or motion filed under
[the] Act may be commenced unless the minor who is the subject of the proceeding is represented
by counsel." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1).
71. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-170(b); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/115-1.5 (2010).
72. See In re D.M., 631 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (111. App. Ct. 1994); In re F.N., 624 N.E.2d 853,
859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
73. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5.
74. Id Other states that allow hybrid appointments include California, Georgia, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. Marcia M. Boumil et al., Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting
Guardian Ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 50 n.48 (2011). The term guardian ad
litem may have different meanings, but it appears that in the context of the Illinois statute it refers
to what the working group on confidentiality of the Fordham University School of Law's
Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children referred to as a "best
interests guardian ad litem" as opposed to a "judicially designated investigator." Boyer, supra
note 9, at 1368-69. For more on these different roles, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
75. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5.
76. The section of the statute on juvenile delinquency proceedings states that a court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor whenever it finds that there may be a conflict of interest
between the minor and his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian or that it is otherwise in the
minor's interest to do so, and that "[u]nless the guardian ad litem is an attorney, he or she shall be
represented by counsel." 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-610(2) (2010). In addition, the statute
points out that minors are not allowed to waive their right to counsel. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/5-
170(b) (2010); see also Diane Geraghty, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children in
Illinois: Roles, Rules and Reforms, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 289, 293 (1998) ("[A] strong argument
can be made that the Act's language, history and context support a conclusion that it envisions the
creation of a traditional attorney-client relationship.").
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to delinquency proceedings as well.77
For this reason, at least according to the interpretation of the Illinois
courts, a court can satisfy its duty to provide counsel by providing a
guardian ad litem who is also a lawyer.78 Thus, according to this view,
the statute expressly recognizes the distinct possibility that an attorney
may be asked to serve as an advocate for a minor client in a delinquency
proceeding at the same time he or she is asked to serve as a guardian ad
litem. Given this approach to the right to counsel, it is not surprising to
learn that it has been reported that "[j]uvenile defenders in a majority of
Illinois' counties represent youth according to the 'best interest' model,
which substitutes the attorney's judgment for the client and can
constrain counsel to the expectations of the court thus limiting
advocacy." 79
In fact, according to the assessment of the Illinois juvenile justice
system by the Children and Family Justice Center of Northwestern
University School of Law and the National Juvenile Defender Center,
many of the delinquency proceedings' lawyers interviewed as part of
the study expressed confusion as to their ethical obligations and
responsibilities to their clients.80 As stated in the report,
Many of the defense attorneys interviewed understood their role as
that of advancing what they determined to be the "best interest" of
their client as opposed to their client's "expressed interest." In
numerous cases, this confusion was exacerbated when the attorney
was appointed as both attorney and guardian ad litem. Team
interviews and observations made clear that in a majority of the
77. For the two most recent instances, see In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) and In re Austin M, 941 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). Interestingly, In re JD., 815
N.E.2d 13, 15-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) is a reverse example of this confusion. In this case, in
order to resolve the issue in the context of an abuse and neglect controversy, the court supported
its conclusion on a delinquency case that had been decided before the amendments to the Juvenile
Court Act that were in place when In re JD. itself was decided. Id. at 15-16.
78. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing the ability of Illinois courts to
provide counsel to a minor by appointing a lawyer as a guardian ad litem).
79. ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL
ASSEMBLY FOR CALENDAR YEARS 2007 AND 2008, at 12-13 (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27897/documents/CHP/Reports/AnnualReports/IJJCAn
nualReport2007-2008.pdf. The confusion is exacerbated by the decision in In re KMB., 462
N.E.2d 1271, 1271-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), decided before the 1998 revisions to the Juvenile
Court Act, in which the Illinois Appellate Court held that at the dispositional stage of a
proceeding, a lawyer has a duty to make recommendations to the court as to what is in the child's
best interest, even when the recommendations are in conflict with the child's wishes. ILLINOIS
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
80. The report states that "[m]any attorneys interviewed as part of the assessment expressed
confusion over their roles, which they attributed to the fact that they are often appointed as
'Attorney-Guardians Ad litem."' ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
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Illinois counties surveyed, juvenile defenders are operating under the
"best interest" model, substituting their judgment for that of their
client. In these counties, there seems to be an expectation among all
concerned (defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and probation
officers) that the role of defense counsel is to do what is "best" for her
client.8'
The report also mentions the specific case of a public defender who
expressed how the situation left her "ill at ease." 82 How can a situation
that leaves the attorney "ill at ease" be adequate when the attorney is the
person the minor depends on to fulfill her ethical obligations and duties
of zealous representation?
The answer is that such a situation cannot be adequate. 83 As the
assessment report concludes, the expectation of serving the minor client
as an advocate and a guardian at the same time "places severe and
unwarranted constraints upon the independence of defense counsel and
improperly limits zealous advocacy on behalf of children who appear in
Illinois' juvenile courts." 84 It also places the attorney in a position
where the attorney violates his or her duties under the rules of
professional conduct because attorneys are tempted to, or do indeed,
81. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3, 126 n.21 (emphasis added). The
assessments in other states reflect similar conclusions. See supra note 7 (providing details
regarding multiple state assessments).
82. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 62-63.
83. This is one of the arguments raised by the appellant in In re Austin M, 941 N.E.2d 903,
917 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). In that case, the attorney was not appointed as a guardian ad litem. Id at
906. He was hired by the juvenile to appear as his lawyer, yet the attorney apparently understood
his role to be that of a guardian instead. Id. As stated in appellant's brief before the Illinois
Supreme Court, "It is axiomatic that adolescents share an almost universal inability to vindicate
their constitutional rights without the assistance of an attorney." Brief for Appellant Austin M.,
supra note 61, at 19 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967)). Granting minors the rights
against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and the rights to notice, confrontation, cross-
examination, and a reasonable doubt burden of proof thus would have little meaning in the
absence of a zealous advocate to vindicate those rights. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 38-39 (citing
PRESIDENT'S COMMISS'N ON L. ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967)) (describing the importance of why counsel should be
appointed to a child in a juvenile proceeding); Brief for Appellant Austin M., supra note 52, at
19; see also Birckhead, supra note 12, at 962 (comparing and contrasting the norms of criminal
defense practice with the culture that permeates many juvenile courts in the United States to show
how rigorous advocacy and accurate fact-finding become compromised in the name of consensus-
building and helping the child).
84. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see also Boumil et al., supra note 74,
at 50 (arguing that "the potential for conflicting obligations in the course of representation is
uncomfortably palpable" when an attorney is asked to act as attorney and guardian ad litem
simultaneously); David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, The New ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103, 108 (2000) (explaining that determining what is in a child's best interest "creates
some serious ethical problems for a licensed attorney').
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substitute their judgment for that of their clients.85  This, in turn, makes
the attorneys vulnerable to attacks of ineffective assistance of counsel,
malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duties.
This situation displays a misunderstanding of the very notion of the
attorney-client relationship and the duties of an attorney under the rules
of professional conduct. The notion that some attorneys are attempting
to serve as guardians ad litem and advocates for the minors at the same
time as long as there is no conflict is a contradiction in terms. There is
no need for a court to have to determine if there is a conflict, as the
statute suggests, because taking on the two roles simultaneously is, by
definition, a conflict of interest.86
IV. THE PROPER ROLE OF AN ATTORNEY IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS
The most basic principle of the attorney-client relationship is that
attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their clients, which include the duty to
avoid conflicts of interests and the duty of confidentiality. Given the
85. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 962 (arguing that even in jurisdictions where attorneys are
trained to advocate for their minor client's expressed interests rather than relying on what the
attorneys deem to be in the child's best interests, the informal culture that permeates most
juvenile courtrooms in the United States makes it difficult for lawyers to act according to their
professional duty); Kruse, supra note 40, at 1319-20 ("Confronted by the realities of overloaded
dockets, routinized [sic] disposition and permanency plans, and punitive attitudes toward children
and their parents, expressed wishes representation becomes more difficult" because these realities
put pressure on lawyers for children to take up the void created by the lack of resources by
"developing an independent, individualized and multidisciplinary determination of their child
clients' best interests that may or may not coincide with their expressed wishes."); see also infra
Parts IV and V (discussing the role of the rules of professional conduct on attorneys representing
children in juvenile courts).
86. In re Shaquanna M., 767 A.2d 155, 165 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) ("[C]ourts do not condone
the policy of appointing one person to fill the different roles of guardian ad litem and attorney.");
Birckhead, supra note 12, at 962 (stating that the informal culture that permeates most juvenile
courtrooms makes it difficult for lawyers to act according to their professional duty); Katner,
supra note 84, at 103 (stating that the guardian ad litem role is "inconsistent with the traditional
functions of an attorney representing a client"); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best
Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1505, 1523 (1996) (explaining that lawyers playing the role of guardian ad
litem often violate professional duties by acting as witnesses, disclosing confidential information,
disregarding their client's requests and not including their clients in the decision making process);
Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil
Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1615 (1996) (arguing that there are stark differences
between the roles of attorney and guardian ad litem); see also Geraghty, supra note 76, at 291.
[T]he most common practice in Illinois is to appoint one person to simultaneously act
as a child's attorney and guardian ad litem. . . . [T]his practice creates an ethical
dilemma for attorneys required to perform both roles because there are inherent
differences between the customary duties of attorneys and guardians ad litem.
Id.
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differences between the roles of an attorney and a guardian ad litem,
when an attorney attempts to fulfill both roles at the same time, all of
these basic elements of the attorney-client relationship, and the ethical
duties created to protect them, are threatened.
Saying that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their clients' means,
broadly speaking, that the attorney is an agent of the client and that
there is an obligation to respect the client's autonomy to make
decisions, at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation,87
and to pursue the client's objectives with diligence.88 Thus, if the
attorney represents the client as an attorney, as opposed to as a
guardian, the lawyer must allow the client to decide the objectives of
representation. 89 If the attorney disagrees with the client's position, or
believes that pursuing the client's stated objective is not in the client's
best interest, the lawyer can counsel the client accordingly, explaining
the disadvantages and dangers of the client's choice, but should
ultimately follow the client's instructions rather than substitute his or
her judgment for that of the client.90
These duties are reflected in the rules of professional conduct 91 and
lawyers must observe them fully and without reservation. Anything less
would be a violation of the lawyer's duties to the client. As explained
by a noted legal ethicist and scholar, "[a]ny lawyer who seeks to lessen
or qualify the degree of his or her duties to a client must expect to be
87. This view is reflected in Rule 1.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which
requires an attorney to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation"
and to "consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." ILL. SUP. CT. R.
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010); see also RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A STUDENT'S GUIDE § 1.2-2(a) (2010) (stating that a lawyer is
the agent (not the guardian) of the client, and must "abide by the client's decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation").
88. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 68-69 (2009).
89. Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1294-95 (1996).
90. See State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 786 (N.M. 2004) ("[A]lthough counsel may advise
the client on counsel's view of the client's best interests, counsel is ultimately required to advance
the client's expressed wishes."); see also Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client:
The Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955,
1959-60 (1996) ("[L]awyers may not normally substitute their own opinions regarding the goals
of the representation."); Green & Dohrn, supra note 89, at 1295 (describing a number of tenants
that a child's lawyer must abide by, including that the child's lawyer must respect the child with
undivided loyalty, and that the lawyer must communicate with the child).
91. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3 (2010) (discussing the fact that a
lawyer must provide competent and diligent representation of a client); ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3 (2010) (outlining the role of a lawyer to be competent, respectful
and diligent in the representation of a client). If the lawyer finds the situation intolerable, he or
she may try to withdraw from representation, though. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.16(b)(4) (2010); ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2010).
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met with the response that the claim is inconsistent with the lawyer's
fiduciary status" 92 and with a possible claim for civil liability.93
A second element of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client is the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest-i.e., a duty to avoid situations where
the attorney faces the risk that his or her duty to a client might be
compromised. Neither the lawyer's own interests nor those of others
"can be permitted to impede or compromise fulfillment of the lawyer's
duties to the client." 94  In fact, merely operating under circumstances
where this risk exists is a conflict of interest. There does not need to be
a violation of a specific duty under the rules of professional conduct for
there to be a violation of the duty to avoid conflicts. Finding oneself in
a situation where there is a significant risk of a violation of a duty to a
client is, in and of itself, a violation of a duty to the client. 95
Again, the rules of professional conduct and their comments clearly
express this view.96 As stated in the comment to Rule 1.7, "a conflict of
interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the
client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other
responsibilities." 97
The reason for this approach to conflicts of interests is simple.
Allowing lawyers to operate under circumstances where there is a risk
that the lawyers will be tempted to violate their duties to their clients
would damage the trust and confidence upon which the attorney-client
relationship must be based. Clients need to be assured that their lawyers
will not be tempted to violate their duties in order to trust them fully
92. GILLERS, supra note 88, at 76.
93. Id. (explaining that a fiduciary duty "is a legal concept so that violation of the duty carries
enforceable civil law remedies"). Courts in Illinois have recognized a civil remedy for damages
caused by a breach of fiduciary duty by lawyers. See, e.g., Bauer v. Hubbard, 593 N.E.2d 569,
572 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that the plaintiff alleged a basis for recovery due to the lawyer
charging excessive fees and violating her fiduciary duty); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 645-46
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (discussing that a fiduciary relationship exists between an attorney and his
client as a matter of law); Kling v. Landry, 686 N.E.2d 33, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (reviewing
whether an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty by coercing a client to engage in sexual
relations). For a discussion on possible civil liability based on the conduct of lawyers for
children, see Katner, supra note 84, at 115-20. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
recognizes a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty if the breach is the legal cause of an
injury to the client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000).
94. GILLERS, supra note 88, at 18 (basing this idea on the fact that a lawyer has a fiduciary
duty to his or her client).
95. Id. at 135.
96. ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.7 (2010).
97. ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2010).
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with their confidences and concerns. 98
Although establishing an attorney-client relationship with a minor
raises some concerns because of the fact that the client is, in fact, a
minor,99 the general principles reflected in the rules do not change
much.100 This conclusion is expressed in Rule 1.14 of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct, which explains the approach an attorney must
follow when establishing an attorney-client relationship with a client
with diminished capacity, in dealing with the allocation of authority
within that relationship, and the general fiduciary duties of the
attorney. 0' The general principle expressed in the rule is that
regardless of the age of the client, the attorney should maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with his or her client, 102 which, of course,
means the attorney has a duty to comply with all the duties any attorney
owes an adult client.
Rule 1.14 does, however, recognize the possibility that because of the
client's age, it may be difficult for the attorney to establish a "normal"
attorney-client relationship 03 and expresses alternative approaches for
such cases. Thus, the rule provides that:
[W]hen the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
98. GILLERS, supra note 88, at 135; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt 6 (2010);
ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000).
99. Henning, supra note 7, at 280 (arguing that real and perceived limitations in a child's
decision-making capacity make it difficult for the attorney-client relationship in delinquency
cases to completely mirror that in adult criminal cases).
100. See Guggenheim, supra note 17, at 1424 (arguing that the role of counsel in juvenile
delinquency proceedings is the same as that of counsel in criminal proceedings involving adults);
Henning, supra note 7, at 280 ("[C]urrent impediments to a normal attorney-child relationship
may not be so insurmountable as to require or justify a model of advocacy that differs so radically
from the representation of adults.").
101. ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2010).
102. Rule 1.14(a) states: "When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental
impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.14(a) (2010). Also, the comment to Rule 1.14 explicitly states that "children as young as five
or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are
entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody." ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2010).
103. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2010) ("When the client is a
minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-
lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects."); Recommendations of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1996)
(stating that the role of the child's lawyer may vary somewhat depending on whether the child has
capacity to direct the representation, but the lawyer for a child who does have capacity should
allow the child to set the goals of the representation as would an adult client).
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capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm
unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action,
including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 104
It is clear, however, that these measures- are not to be taken routinely
but only in rare circumstances. 105 In addition, although it is important
for the lawyer to understand what the client's best interests might be, a
lawyer should respect the client's autonomy when deciding to take
protective action. 106 This is why the rules prefer that the attorney seek
the appointment of a guardian rather than have the attorney substitute
his or her judgment for that of the child.107 This course of action
reflects the view of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the
American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards. 08
In other words, the clear message throughout Rule 1.14 and its
comment is that, other than in rare situations, an attorney representing a
minor should act as an advocate for the minor and should avoid
deciding for the minor what in the attorney's opinion may be in the
minor's best interest. Moreover, even in emergency situations, the
attorney is only permitted to use his or her judgment to make decisions
for the client in limited circumstances to protect the client from possible
harm. In addition, the attorney needs to understand that, even in those
circumstances, he or she "has the same duties . . . as the lawyer would
104. ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2010).
105. The lawyer is to take action only if the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or
to make adequately considered decisions and if the attorney "reasonably believes that a client is at
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and . .. a normal client-
lawyer relationship cannot be maintained." ILL. S. CT. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5
(2010); see also ROTUNDA & DzIENKOWSKI, supra note 87, § 1.14-2.
106. On this point, the comment to the rule states that
[i]n taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the
wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the
goals of intruding into the client's decision making autonomy to the least extent
feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social
connections.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010).
107. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 7 (2010) ("If a legal
representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests.").
108. AM. BAR ASS'N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 12, §§ 3.1, 5.2. According to
the ABA/IJA standards, if the attorney believes that the minor is not capable of making an
informed judgment or is compromised in some way, she can request that the court appoint a
guardian ad litem specifically for the purpose of representing the client's "best interest." Id. §
3.1(b)(ii)(c)(2).
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with respect to a client" 109 and that substituting the attorney's judgment
for that of the client should end as soon as it is possible "to regularize
the relationship or implement other protective solutions.""10
In contrast, the relationship between a guardian ad litem and a minor
is fundamentally different. An attorney's role is to be a legal advocate
for his or her client, which means that the attorney has a duty to advance
the client's objectives as defined by the client. The role of the guardian
ad litem, on the other hand, is to use the guardian's judgment to seek
whatever he or she decides is in the best interest of the child, and often,
to gather information to share with the court in order to aid it in making
judicial decisions affecting the disposition of the child. The attorney-
advocate owes his or her duties to the child. The guardian owes his or
her duties to the court.11
109. The comments to the rule discuss the proper approach to take in emergency situations as
follows:
In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with
seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a
lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is
unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered
judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that
person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however,
the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no
other lawyer, agent or other representative available, except when that representative's
actions or inaction threaten immediate and irreparable harm to the person. The lawyer
should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary
to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm.
A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the
same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. A lawyer
who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency
should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them
only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer
should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of
his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the
relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a
lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken.
ILL. Sup. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 10 (2010).
1 10. Id.
111. Id.; see also In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d 796 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (describing the
duties of a guardian as case-specific and should be set by trial judge); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d
676, 687 (Conn. 1998) (stating that in a custody matter, a child's attorney is an advocate for the
child, while the guardian ad litem is the representative of the child's bests interests); Clarke v.
Chi. Title & Trust Co., 66 N.E.2d 378, 383-384 (Ill. 1946) (holding that guardians are agents or
officers of the court); Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 152 (Wyo. 1998) (explaining that the
guardian ad litem's role is that of an investigator, monitor, and champion for the child while the
traditional role of an attorney is that of advisor, advocate, negotiator, and intermediary who is not
free to independently determine and advocate the child's "best interests" if contrary to the
preferences of the child); Estate of Milstein v. Ayers, 955 P.2d 78, 83 (Colo. App. 1998) (holding
that a guardian acts as a special fiduciary, while counsel is an advocate for and represents the
legal interests of the minor); Henning, supra note 7, at 266 (describing how the term "counsel" is
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As explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a case involving
the custody of a young woman with Down's syndrome,112
[T]he attorney's role differs from that of a guardian ad litem. . .. A
court-appointed counsel's services are to the child. Counsel acts as an
independent legal advocate . .. and takes an active part in the hearing,
ranging from subpoenaing and cross-examining witnesses to appealing
the decision, if warranted. If the purpose of the appointment is for
legal advocacy, then counsel would be appointed. A court-appointed
guardian ad litem's services are to the court . . . . The [guardian ad
litem] acts as an independent fact finder, investigator and evaluator as
to what furthers the best interests of the child. The [guardian ad litem]
submits a written report to the court and is available to testify. If the
purpose of the appointment is for independent investigation and fact
finding, then a [guardian ad litem] would be appointed. The [guardian
ad litem] can be an attorney, a social worker, a mental health
professional or other appropriate person .... 113
For these reasons, representing a minor client while attempting to
operate as a guardian ad litem at the same time threatens the validity of
the representation itself by disregarding the basic principles of the
attomey-client relationship. Thus, the approach that permits the
possibility of attorneys assuming a hybrid role of attorney and guardian
ad litem threatens the quality of representation provided to minors and
should be abandoned.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ROLE CONFUSION
An attorney who is also a guardian will have to choose between
advancing the client's desired objectives, as required by the duties
prescribed in the rules of professional conduct, or violating those duties
in order to advocate for what the attorney believes to be in the best
interest of the minor. If the attorney chooses the first option, the
attorney disregards his duty as a guardian. If the attorney chooses the
second option, the attorney violates his professional duties as a
lawyer.11 4 Either way, the attorney will fail at one of his or her duties.
hard to define, while the term "ad litem" is often defined by statutes).
112. In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1283 (N.J. 1994).
113. Id at 1283. Note, however, that the court here seems to be using the term guardian ad
litem to refer to a combination of what has been called a "best interests" guardian and a
"judicially designated investigator," whose role is "to serve as the eyes and ears of the appointing
authority, to gather information to share with the court, and to aid in making judicial decisions
affecting the disposition of the child." Boyer, supra note 9, at 1374.
114. Interestingly, to eliminate the choice, statutes in Michigan and Colorado actually
mandate that the attorney act as a guardian ad litem rather than as an attorney. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 712A.17d(1)(h)(i) (2009) (stating that a lawyer-guardian has a duty "[t]o make a
determination regarding the child's best interests and advocate for those best interests according
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Thus, this is a classic example of a conflict of interest' 15 that can, and
usually does, result in ineffective assistance of counsell1 6 because when
an attorney chooses to represent the client according to what the lawyer
thinks are the best interests of the client, the attorney may forgo
challenging the State's evidence, or otherwise decide not to pursue a
vigorous defense. This situation, in turn, leaves the client, who may be
facing lifelong negative consequences, legally vulnerable.117
Making matters worse, confusion over the role of an attorney can
affect the duty of confidentiality owed to a minor.118 An attorney for a
minor, just like any other attorney with any other type of client, is
bound by the duty of confidentiality expressed in the rules of
professional conduct.119 For this reason, the attorney has an obligation
to keep information related to the representation confidential unless an
to the lawyer-guardian's understanding of those best interests, regardless of whether the lawyer-
guardian's determination reflects the child's wishes"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-116(2) (2009)
("[T]he legal representative of the child is not required to adopt the child's wishes in his or her
recommendation or advocacy for the child.").
115. People v. Daly, 792 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (stating that a guardian's duty
to the court may put an attorney in a position of having to choose between conflicting duties).
The Report of the working group on conflicts of interest of the Fordham Conference on Ethical
Issues in the Legal Representation of Children expresses the following conclusion:
In some jurisdictions, the lawyer may be assigned to serve simultaneously as a child's
lawyer and a child's guardian ad litem. Depending on how those different roles are
defined, and on the expectations for a lawyer serving in both roles simultaneously, this
presents the possibility of having conflicting sets of obligations. For example, the role
of the child's lawyer may be to advocate for what the child wishes, while the role of
the guardian ad litem may be to advocate for what the guardian ad litem personally
believes to be in the child's best interests. When the child's wishes differ from what
the lawyer perceives to be in the child's best interests, the lawyer serving in both roles
will be obligated to advocate for inconsistent positions.
Report of the Working Group on Conflicts ofInterest, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379, 1381 (1996).
The standards adopted by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association in 1995
reached the same conclusion. Linda D. Elrod, An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of Practice
for Lawyers Representing Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1999,
2007 (1996).
116. Report of the Working Group on Conflicts ofInterest, supra note 115, at 1387.
117. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 22; see also Henning, supra note 7, at
288 (explaining that it is never appropriate for a lawyer to abandon his loyalty to the client and
assume the role of best-interest guardian).
118. The issues related to the competing duties regarding confidentiality as they relate to the
confusion of roles of attorneys and guardians is examined in Boyer, supra note 9, at 1386-87.
The report identifies three different possible roles with three different levels of protection for
confidential information. Id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the three
models as "expressed interests lawyer or advocate," "best interests lawyer or guardian," and
"judicially designated investigator").
119. ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010).
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exception to the rule applies.120
In contrast, to fulfill the duties as a guardian, the attorney must be
available to testify at the request of the court about the attorney's
conclusions regarding what the attorney believes to be the best interests
of the child. For this reason, information provided to an attorney
serving as a "best interest guardian ad litem" is only partially
protected'21 and information provided to a guardian judicially
designated as an investigator to report to the court is not protected at
all.122 Thus, an attorney representing a child and simultaneously acting
as a guardian has a conflicting duty to keep the child's information
confidential and to disclose it. Obviously, this is an irreconcilable
conflict, as already recognized by the Illinois Court of Appeals.123
If there is a disagreement or a misunderstanding regarding the
attorney's role, the attorney will have to decide whether to reveal
confidential information against his client's wishes or to refuse to reveal
it. If the attorney does disclose the information, the attorney violates
the duty of confidentiality. 124 If, on the other hand, the attorney
120. STERLING, supra note 38, at 12. Juvenile defense counsel has an affirmative obligation
to safeguard a client's information from parents or guardians. Id. Parents or guardians do not
have any right to inspect a juvenile defense counsel's file, notes, discovery, or any other case-
related documents without the client's consent. Id. Even if revealing the information might
allow the client to receive sorely-needed services, defense counsel is bound to protect the client's
confidences, unless the client gives the attorney express permission to reveal the information to
get the particular services, or disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the client's case
objectives. Id.
121. Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 154 (Wyo. 1998) (stating that while it is always best
to seek consent prior to divulging otherwise confidential information, an attorney/guardian ad
litem is not prohibited from disclosure of client communications absent the child's consent); see
also Boyer, supra note 9, at 1372 (explaining that information disclosed to a "best interest
guardian ad litem" can and should be disclosed when disclosure is in the best interest of the
child).
122. The principal responsibility of a guardian-investigator lies in serving the needs of the
court rather than the interests of the child. Any information shared with a person acting in this
capacity should be communicated to the court, regardless of the desire of the individual child to
keep the information confidential. As a result, a child has no legitimate expectation that this type
of communication will be kept in confidence. Boyer, supra note 9, at 1374.
123. In re J.D., 815 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("Independent counsel would be
required when an attorney's dual representation creates a conflict between his roles of attorney
and guardian, e.g., when a minor is of an age to share with his attorney confidences the attorney
would not be permitted to share with the guardian ad litem.").
124. Hollister v. Hollister, 496 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Wis. 1992) (holding that a guardian
appointed under statute in custody matters functions as lawyer and therefore could not be called
as witness or cross-examined in a custody proceeding); Clark, 953 P.2d at 152-53 (holding that
an attorney appointed as guardian ad litem should act as an advocate for the child and still has the
same ethical responsibilities in the proceeding as any other attorney and should not engage in ex
parte communications with the trial court); State Bar of Michigan, Informal Op. RI-318 (2000)
(holding that a lawyer-guardian for minor in protective proceeding is bound by rules of
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chooses not to violate this duty, the attorney will fail in his duty to the
court as a guardian.
From the minor's point of view, there is a similar concern. Minors
who do not fully comprehend counsel's conflicting obligations will feel
betrayed when they realize the person they thought would guard their
confidences will reveal them. On the other hand, minors who do
understand the possibility that the attorney may have to disclose the
information, may not freely disclose it, which can affect their
representation. This is contrary to the public policy that supports
recognizing the duty of confidentiality in the first place. These minors
will not feel that they can trust their attorneys and the attorneys will not
be able to provide competent representation. 125
Thus, again, any attempt to simultaneously serve as an attorney and a
guardian ad litem in a delinquency proceeding inevitably places the
attorney in a position to violate a duty or to fail in his or her
performance of a duty.126 Obviously, again, this is a classic example of
a conflict of interest because the attorney finds himself or herself in a
position where he or she cannot perform one duty because of a
competing obligation. 127
Surprisingly, however, this type of conflicted representation is
currently permitted across the state of Illinois and, for all the reasons
discussed here, in each and every one of the cases in which this has
happened the representation was (or is) of questionable validity. It can
easily be argued that in all those cases the minor client has been (or is
being) deprived of his or her statutory and constitutional right to counsel
or his or her right to effective assistance of counsel. 128
professional conduct and, therefore, must not reveal child's confidences); Christopher N. Wu,
Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children in Dependency Cases, 64 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1857, 1871 (1996) (questioning whether attorney who conceives of his or her role as
representing the attorney's view of the child's best interests is engaged in the practice of law at
all).
125. Emily Buss, "You're my What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers'Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1713-16 (1996).
126. Stuckey, supra note 9, at 1801 (requiring attorney serving as a guardian ad litem to keep
information confidential makes no sense because it would defeat the purpose of the guardian ad
litem appointment).
127. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1819, 1823 (1996) (explaining that a common example of a possible conflict
of interests arises when an attorney serves both as the child's attorney and as guardian ad litem
because the guardian ad litem is traditionally viewed as an agent of the court, to which she owes
her primary duty of allegiance while an attorney is the child's representative and, as such, will
typically be expected to advocate the child's wishes and desires).
128. This was one of the conclusions of the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children. See Report of the Working Group on Conflicts of Interest,
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The cruel irony of the position taken by the Illinois courts is that
while the courts claim that their interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act
is designed to protect the rights of minors facing delinquency
proceedings, in actuality, it threatens those rights. Every time a court
fails to assign an attorney to a minor because it has assigned a guardian
who is also an attorney, the court is actually depriving the minor of
representation in violation of the constitutional right to counsel.129
Every time that an attorney acts as a guardian after having been
assigned as an attorney, the minor is deprived of effective assistance of
counsel, also in violation of a constitutional right. In addition, in a case
like the second one, the attorney violates his or her duties of
professional conduct and acts in a way that may give rise to civil
liability for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.130 Any way you
look at it, the role confusion created by the courts' interpretation of the
Juvenile Court Act ends up hurting, rather than helping, the minors they
are supposed to be protecting. 131
VI. SERVING AS ATTORNEY AND GUARDIAN SIMULTANEOUSLY: IS IT
REALLY JUSTIFIED?
If attempting to serve as an advocate and a guardian at the same time
is really such a bad thing, why do courts in Illinois seem to be oblivious
to the problem? How do they justify exposing minors who face
delinquency proceedings to this type of problematic representation?
The answer-developed by the courts and then repeated over the
years-is twofold. The first part of the answer is to continue to assert
that juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from criminal
trials. The second part, which to a certain extent follows from the first
one, is simply to assert that there really is no problem. For example, in
supra note 115, at 1387. The standards adopted by the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association in 1995 reached the same conclusion: that serving as advocate and guardian at the
same time would deny the minor effective assistance of counsel. Elrod, supra note I15, at 2007.
The case of In re Austin M. provides a good example. In that case, the attorney arguably did not
file a meritorious motion to suppress an involuntary confession, among other things because he
believed that his duty was to help the prosecution and the court to find the truth related to the
facts of the case. In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d 903, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
129. This problem is specifically mentioned in the assessment report of South Carolina when
it says that "[t]he ethical and role confusion that often characterizes juvenile court practice leaves
far too many children literally defenseless." SOUTH CAROLINA ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note
7, at 51.
130. For a discussion on possible civil liability based on the conduct of lawyers for children,
see Katner, supra note 84, at 115-20.
131. Henning, supra note 7, at 285 ("[A] model of advocacy that denies the child a
meaningful voice in the attorney-client relationship, and thus in the juvenile justice system as a
whole, may actually hinder the rehabilitative and public safety objectives of the court.").
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In re R.D., the First District of the Appellate Court of Illinois expressed
both ideas when it stated:
The responsibility of the court-appointed juvenile counsel . . . is
different than that of other court-appointed counsel. The juvenile
counsel must not only protect the juvenile's legal rights but he must
also recognize and recommend a disposition in the juvenile's best
interest, even when the juvenile himself does not recognize those
interests. As our supreme court stated in In re Beasley ... : Although
such proceeding [under the Juvenile Court Act] retains certain
adversary characteristics, it is not in the usual sense an adversary
proceeding, but it is one to be administered in a spirit of humane
concern for and to promote the welfare of the minor as well as to serve
the best-interests of the community. 132
This view, however, misses the problem entirely. Whether juvenile
proceedings have evolved to be considered akin to criminal trials, thus,
requiring the same level of Constitutional protection for juveniles may
still be under debate.133 However, there should be no debate that
allowing an attorney to serve as an attorney and as a guardian at the
same time is a problem.
A few cases will suffice to illustrate the problem. In In re KMB.,
for example, a thirteen-year-old asked her court appointed attorney to
argue in favor of allowing her to remain at home. 135 Instead, the
attorney argued exactly the opposite. 136 Stating that he agreed with the
State's position, he argued in favor of removing the client from her
home.137 On appeal, the minor argued that this resulted in a violation of
her constitutional right to counsel, but in a decision that illustrates the
confusion over the roles of attorneys and guardians as interpreted in
Illinois, the court held that a court-appointed juvenile counsel is
obligated to protect a child client's legal rights and best interests
simultaneously.138 Defying logic, the court held that this simultaneous
132. In re R.D., 499 N.E.2d 478,481-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
133. See supra notes 48-70 and accompanying text (explaining that the juvenile justice
system in Illinois has become like a criminal trial system for young adults, straying from its
intended rehabilitative principles); see also In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 244-53 (111.
2011) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Juvenile Court Act and upholding the position
that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature and thus do not warrant a jury trial in all
instances); id at 263-74 (Burke, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Juvenile Justice Reform
Provisions and amendments to the Juvenile Court Act have made juvenile proceedings criminal in
nature and thus juvenile defendants have a constitutional right to a jury trial).
134. 462 N.E.2d 1271 (111. App. Ct. 1984).
135. Id. at 1271.
136. Id at 1272.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1272-73.
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advocacy of diametrically opposed positions did not constitute a conflict
between the roles of an attorney and a guardian ad litem for a minor.1 39
The court's position would have required the attorney to argue
simultaneously that the court should allow the child to remain at home
and that it would be better that the court did not allow her to stay at
home.
The court justifies this impossible-to-achieve mandate by simply
stating that "[i]t is not always possible for a juvenile's counsel to carry
out his unique responsibility to protect the juvenile's best interest
without alienating the juvenile" because "[a] delinquent juvenile's
wishes are often not in his best interest." 140 The court then firmly
concluded that "[i]f protecting a juvenile's best interest requires that the
counsel make a recommendation contrary to the juvenile's wishes, then
the counsel has . . . a 'professional responsibility and obligation' to
make that recommendation." 141
Ironically, the court's position amounts to asserting that the attorney
has a professional responsibility to violate his or her duties of
professional responsibility. The attorney should have recognized that it
was the prosecution's duty to prove the case against the client and the
court's duty to determine the proper adjudication of the case. Joining
the prosecution and the judge in a common effort meant the attorney
was willing to act against his own client's wishes and, thus, constituted
a betrayal of his duty of loyalty.
Similarly, in In re B.K., the court acknowledged that it was "mindful
[that] there are inherent conflicts that exist when an attorney acts as
both a juvenile's attorney as well as his guardian ad litem."1 42 Yet,
despite this, the court concluded that there is no per se conflict of
interest when an attorney acts as both the guardian ad litem and defense
counsel. 143 The court, however, fails to explain how it is possible that
an "inherent" conflict is not a "per se" conflict. If the conflict is, in fact,
inherent to the relationship, it is, by definition, a permanent and
defining characteristic of it.
Yet, these illogical conclusions have been reaffirmed throughout the
years in both abuse and neglect cases and delinquency proceedings by
simply repeating the outdated rhetoric that a juvenile proceeding is
different than a trial and by citing mostly cases decided before the
139. Id at 1272-73.
140. Id. at 1273.
141. Id.
142. In re B.K., 833 N.E.2d 945, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
143. Id. at 952.
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changes to the juvenile justice system in 1998. In fact, just last year, the
court of appeals reiterated this old approach to the problem in two
cases.t 44 In both cases, In re Rodney S. and In re Austin M., the minors
alleged on appeal that their attorneys operated as guardians rather than
as advocates for their rights, resulting in a violation of their
constitutional right to counsel. In both cases, the court of appeals
rejected the argument.14 5
Just like in In re KMB., if the attorneys had been specifically
appointed to serve as guardians ad litem, the minors in In Re Rodney S.
and in In Re Austin M had no legal representation during the
proceedings, resulting in a violation of their rights. If, on the other
hand, the attorneys were supposed to have been acting as attorneys for
their clients, obviously their job was to represent their clients' expressed
interests, not to advocate against them.
Given the attorneys' duty to establish an attorney-client relationship
with the minors and to zealously advocate for their position, by arguing
against their clients and in favor of the state's position, the attorneys in
both of these cases essentially ceased representing their clients. Thus,
even though the children supposedly had attorneys providing legal
representation, in reality, they merely had guardians who were not
performing the duties of an attorney. The minors were, in fact, forced
to face the proceedings without legal representation in violation of the
Constitution and the Juvenile Court Act. Thus, these cases illustrate
why appointing a guardian ad litem should not be considered to comply
with the state's obligation to provide attorneys for minors.
When the minor in In re Rodney S. appealed arguing, among other
things, that he was denied his right to counsel because his court-
appointed lawyer acted as a guardian ad litem rather than as his
attorney, 146 the case presented a perfect opportunity to address the
problem. Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not agree with the
appellant and in an extremely brief statement it cursorily dismissed the
argument as follows:
Proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act are not adversarial in the
144. See In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d 903, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("[W]e are unpersuaded
and adhere to the established, above-cited case law in Illinois, which allows and, in most cases,
encourages counsel for juvenile respondents to protect both minors' legal rights and the best
interests of minors and society."); In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d 588, 593-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
("Accordingly, we adhere to our previously expressed view that the appointment of a lawyer to
act as both a juvenile's trial attorney and guardian ad litem does not create aper se conflict of
interest.").
145. In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d at 918; In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d at 596.
146. In re Rodney S., 932 N.E.2d at 591.
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traditional sense. "Unlike a purely adversarial proceeding, a juvenile
case requires the juvenile's welfare and best interests to be
considered." In In re Beasley, the supreme court described
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act as follows:
Although such a proceeding retains certain adversary
characteristics, it is not in the usual sense an adversary
proceeding, but it is one to be administered in a spirit of humane
concern for and to promote the welfare of the minor as well as to
serve the best interests of the community.
Put another way, a delinquency proceeding under the Juvenile Court
Act is not a traditional criminal prosecution. A lawyer's responsibility
in a juvenile case is unique because counsel has to protect the
juvenile's best interests even if those interests do not correspond with
the juvenile's wishes. As this court has previously stated, "[t]he roles
of a guardian ad litem and minor's counsel are not inherently in
conflict" because "[bjoth have 'essentially the same obligations to the
minor and to society."' 14
7
Again, lacking any support other than the repeated and outdated
rhetoric that a juvenile proceeding is different than a criminal trial, the
court concludes that its interpretation of the Juvenile Court Act follows
what it refers to as a "common sense approach."' 48 The court fails to
explain, however, why it is considered common sense to appoint an
attorney to a task that, as discussed above, is inevitably destined to
either fail or violate duties of professional responsibility.
Two months later, the appellate court reaffirmed this view in In re
Austin M., which again exemplifies the problem.14 9  In this case, a
lawyer was hired to represent two minors in a delinquency
proceeding.15 0 The attorney was hired to appear as the minors' lawyer,
and at a pre-trial hearing the trial court underscored this by informing
the boys' parents that the appointed counsel "represented" the minors
and not them (the parents).' 5 ' However, the judge then stated that the
attorney "represents what's in the best interest" of the boys.152 To make
matters worse, notwithstanding the fact that the lawyer was hired to
appear as the attorney for the minors, the attorney apparently
147. Id at 594 (citations omitted).
148. Id ("[W]e adhere to the wisdom shown by the cases that we have cited, which we
conclude suggest a commonsense approach to protecting juveniles in delinquency proceedings.").
149. In re Austin M, 941 N.E.2d at 916.
150. Interestingly, the fact that the attorney represented the two minors jointly also gave rise
to a claim of conflict of interest based on the joint representation itself. Id at 912-13.
151. Idat906.
152. Brief for Appellant Austin M., supra note 61, at 3, 28; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-Appellant, supra note 61, at 35.
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understood his role to be that of a guardian instead.15 3  He even
expressed that he understood his role to be the same as that of the
prosecutors.154
On appeal, one of the minors alleged that he was denied his right to
counsel because the attorney aligned himself with the prosecution and
the judge in what was referred to as "a common search for the 'truth',"
and took the position that the defendants should be found guilty.155 In
addition, one of the minors also argued that in order to pursue this
"search for truth," the attorney failed to challenge the admissibility of
some statements at trial, did not cross-examine three witnesses, and did
not file a motion to suppress a statement to the police. 156
These circumstances demonstrate how complex the misunderstanding
of the lawyer's role can be. The problem began with the judge who first
suggested that the attorney would serve as an advocate for the children,
but then described the attorney's role as that of a best interest guardian
ad litem. Then, as if that was not enough, the attorney explicitly stated
he understood his role as a judicially appointed guardian whose role
would be the same as that the prosecutor.15 1 It is difficult to envision a
more profound misunderstanding within one case.
Given the facts of the case, particularly the fact that the attorney
representing juveniles accused of delinquent conduct thought his role
was the same as that of the prosecutors, the end result was that the
juveniles either did not have legal representation or were the victims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. For this reason, after the minors were
convicted, one of them appealed, arguing among other things, that he
had been denied his right to counsel because the attorney acted as a
guardian ad litem and as a defense counsel simultaneously.' 58
On appeal, the court agreed that even though the attorney had not
been officially appointed as a guardian, it was clear he thought his role
was to act like one and, in fact, did act like one, thus creating a
problematic issue of role confusion.159 The court, therefore, treated the
153. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-
Appellant, supra note 61, at 38.
154. Brief for Appellant Austin M., supra note 61, at 29; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-Appellant, supra note 61, at 33.
155. Brief for Appellant Austin M., supra note 61, at 29.
156. Id. at 35; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondent-Appellant, supra note 61, at 21-27.
157. Brief for Appellant Austin M., supra note 61, at 29; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent-Appellant, supra note 61, at 33.
158. In re Austin M., 941 N.E.2d 903, 906, 912, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
159. Id.
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issues raised by the minor as if the trial court had formally appointed the
attorney as guardian ad litem. 160
However, the court did not find that the minor's rights had been
violated and affirmed the lower court's decision. Once again, the court
based its conclusion on the rhetoric that "the responsibility of the
court-appointed juvenile counsel varies from that of other
court-appointed counsel because juvenile proceedings under the Act are
not as adversarial as traditional, criminal proceedings."161 The court
cited the terms of the Juvenile Court Act to support the position that
"appointment of separate counsel is unnecessary when the trial court
has already appointed a guardian ad litem who is also a licensed
attorney,"1 62 which simply misses the point of the argument.
The point of the argument is that having an attorney simultaneously
serve as guardian and as an attorney results in a violation of the minor's
rights. The court's response is that it does not violate the minor's rights
because the Act allows it. In other words, there is no conflict because
the Act says there is no conflict.
This circular argument lacks logic and, perhaps not surprisingly,
leads to a conclusion that explains the underlying approach to juvenile
justice in Illinois: "by permitting an attorney to fulfill both roles, the Act
recognizes that '[t]he roles of a guardian ad litem and minor's counsel
are not inherently in conflict' because '[b]oth have essentially the same
obligations to the minor and to society."'l 63
In other words, according to the court, when representing a minor in a
delinquency proceeding, the lawyer's role is that of a guardian ad litem.
According to the court, there is no difference between the two, or, if
there is a difference, the role of guardian takes priority.164
160. Id. at 916.
161. Id at 917.
162. Id
163. Id (citing In re J.D., 815 N.E.2d 13, 15 (111. App. Ct. 2004)).
164. See Buss, supra note 125, at 1702 (arguing that hybrid models of representation are
essentially variations on the guardian ad litem model, "because they all allow for substitution of
the lawyer's judgment for that of the client, and a communication of this substituted judgment to
the court"); see also In the Interest of K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (111. App. Ct. 1984)
(holding that a minor's right to counsel was not violated when an assistant public defender, acting
as the minor's guardian ad litem, recommended a disposition contrary to her wishes). This view
should be contrasted with the approach taken in In re A. W., 618 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993),
where the court came close to breaking away from the trend. In this case, again, the attorney
refused to advocate for the expressed interest of a minor. Id. at 731. Unlike in the other cases,
however, the minor reacted to the attorney's decision to advocate against his desired position by
requesting the court to appoint a new attorney who would do so. Id The state objected to the
request, but the trial court granted the motion for substitution of counsel and the appellate court
affirmed. Id. at 732. However, the decision is still confusing because while holding that a
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The problem with this analysis is that it eliminates the effectiveness
of the attorney's role as an attorney, affects the attorney-client
relationship, destroys the necessary trust upon which that relationship
must be based, creates a mandatory duty to disclose confidential
information that does not exist according to the rules of professional
conduct and essentially leaves the minor without legal representation.
These are significant drawbacks, all of which can easily be avoided by
simply taking the position that the roles of attorney and guardian should
be performed by different individuals.
It is precisely because a guardian and an attorney do not have the
same obligations to the minor that the roles are in conflict. The New
Jersey Supreme Court explained the basis for this conclusion in In re
MR., a case in which the lower court had been asked to determine with
which parent a client with diminished capacity should live.16 5 Having
considered the differences in the roles of an attorney and a guardian ad
litem,t6 6 the court went on to conclude that the proper role for an
attorney must be that of a zealous advocate, leaving the role of the
guardian to someone else:
[T]he role of an attorney in abuse or neglect cases and in termination
of parental rights cases must be as an advocate for the child. Nothing
short of zealous representation is adequate to protect a child's
fundamental legal rights .. .. Requiring attorneys to act as counsel for
children in these cases, does not deprive the court of the benefit of the
type of assistance afforded by a guardian ad litem. Clearly, as counsel
for the child, an attorney could request the additional appointment of a
guardian ad litem, and the court sua sponte could do so if deemed
necessary. Yet by clarifying an attorney's role as counsel for the
child, substantial evidentiary and procedural dilemmas could be
solved. Under the present situation where attorneys assume a hybrid
role of attorney/social investigator, questions arise such as the right of
the attorney to speak with the parties outside the presence of their
counsel; whether communications between a child and the attorney are
privileged; and whether an attorney who submits an investigative
report is subject to cross-examination. Finally, having attorneys act as
counsel for children insures that they are being utilized for a role for
which they are trained and suited.167
minor's right to counsel is "almost coextensive to that afforded to adults," the court again
declared that attorneys and guardians ad litem "have essentially the same obligations to the minor
and to society." Id. at 732-33 (citing In re R.D., 499 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
165. In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274 (N.J. 1994).
166. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (discussing the court's approach to the
distinction between the roles as attorney/advocate and guardian ad litem).
167. In re MR., 638 A.2d at 1284; see also Jacobsen v. Thomas, 100 P.3d 106, 111 (Mont.
2004) (holding that the role of a guardian ad litem is different from the traditional advocacy role
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If this is so in cases of visitation, custody, and abuse and neglect, it is
even more critical in delinquency proceedings. Given the close analogy
to criminal proceedings, the role of an attorney in delinquency
proceedings must be that of a zealous advocate for the child as
prescribed by the rules of professional conduct. Nothing short of such
zealous representation would be adequate to protect a child's
fundamental legal rights. 168 As expressed by the team that conducted
an assessment of the juvenile justice system in Nebraska,
The professional rules of responsibility, relevant legal scholarship, and
professional standards and guidelines are unanimous that juvenile
defense attorneys have an ethical duty to advocate for the client's
expressed interests, as opposed to the client's best interests as
determined by the attorney, the judge, the prosecutor, the probation
officer, or the client's parents. These roles are very distinct, with
different, often opposing, ethical mandates. Ethical canons require
defense counsel to act in the child's expressed interest, serving as the
child's voice in court proceedings and zealously advocating for what
the child wants. In contrast, the [guardian ad litem], unmoored from
the child's expressed interest, acts in the child's best interest. In other
words, the [guardian ad litem] can substitute her own judgment for the
child's, and advocate for what she believes should happen in the case,
regardless of the child's wishes. Juvenile defenders owe their clients
the same ethical duties of loyalty, communication, and confidentiality
that adult criminal defense attorneys owe their clients, and are bound
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ethical code for
attorneys, to "zealously assert the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system."169
It is precisely for these reasons that many have adopted the view that
attorneys should operate as advocates for the child's expressed wishes
played by attorneys and, thus, an attorney appointed by the court to represent a child is not also
the guardian ad litem).
168. As the Supreme Court stated in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967),
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make
skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child "requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
Id. Since the publication of the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards, which
explicitly called for client-directed, zealous advocacy at all phases of delinquency proceedings,
those who train and set advocacy standards for juvenile defenders have emphasized the duty of
lawyers to represent the client's expressed interest and not to advocate for some other person's
determination of the juvenile's best interests. Birckhead, supra note 12, at 967; AM. BAR ASS'N
& INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 12, §§ 3.1(a), 9.4(a); Guggenheim, supra note 12, at
86-90; Marrus, supra note 12, at 342.
169. NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 53 (citations omitted).
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and not as guardians ad litem.170  For example, this is the view of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.171 This is also the
approach adopted by the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases. 172 According to these
standards, an attorney for a child "owes the same duties of undivided
loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is
due an adult client" because "to ensure that the child's independent
voice is heard, the child's attorney must advocate the child's articulated
position." 73
170. STERLING, supra note 38, at 3 (quoting Henning, supra note 7, at 255-56) (stating that
since the early 1980s there has been "professional consensus that defense attorneys owe their
juvenile clients the same duty of loyalty as adult clients" which means there is a duty to
"represent the legitimate 'expressed interests' of their juvenile clients, and not the 'best interests'
as determined by the attorney"); Appell, supra note 90, at 1965-68 (arguing that conventional
legal training and education does not equip attorneys to make decisions on behalf of children);
Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can't or Won't Direct Counsel: Best Interests
Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 382 (2011) ("Over the past two decades,
children's rights scholars and child advocacy groups have argued with increasing force that
children's lawyers should function as traditional, client-directed attorneys and that lawyers
overstep their professional role . . . when they engage in discretionary best interests
representation."); Elrod, supra note 115, at 2001 ("Nothing in a lawyer's training qualifies a
lawyer to make decisions on behalf of a client, especially a child client."); Katherine Hunt
Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court: Lessons from a Civil Gideon Experiment, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 93, 110-13 (2010) (noting that the "value of a client-directed lawyer for the child
cannot be underestimated" and that "[1]awyering models that undermine client autonomy also
undermine rights"); Geraghty, supra note 76, at 293 (showing, by way of example, the way in
which the roles of attorney and guardian ad litem can conflict); Martin Guggenheim, The AAML's
Revised Standards for Representing Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings: The
Reporter's Perspective, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 251, 261-69 (2009) ("[L]awyers
should be used [for children] . . . only when courts want children's lawyers to advocate for the
outcome desired by the child."); LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed
Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 607-15 (2009) (arguing for a
number of reasons, including due process concerns, that children in dependency proceedings
receive client-directed attorneys).
171. Ann Haralambie, Response to the Working Group on Determining the Best Interest of the
Child, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2013-14 (1996) (citing AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL
LAWYERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN: STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM
IN CUSTODY OR VISITATION PROCEEDINGS 2.3-2.4 (1995)) ("The AAML Standards view
children as either 'impaired' or 'unimpaired,' with the child's lawyer taking a position in the case
generally only as directed by the unimpaired client.").
172. AM. BAR Ass'N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter
AM. BAR ASS'N STANDARDS], available at http://www.abanet.org/family/reports/standards_
abuseneglect.pdf; see also Elrod, supra note 115, at 2000-01 ("[T]he [ABA Standards] take the
position that lawyers should be appointed as lawyers and act as lawyers irrespective of the age of
the client.").
173. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 1-2. Although the standards do not
seem to recognize an inherent conflict in having an attorney serve as attorney and guardian at the
same time, they explicitly state it is preferable for an attorney to serve as an attorney rather than
as a guardian. Id at 1-3. They also state that in case of a conflict, the attorney should resign as
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In sum, when it comes to delinquency proceedings, the approach of
the courts that have allowed, or, worse, encouraged, attorneys to serve
as attorneys and guardians at the same time, although based on good
intentions, generates circumstances that threaten minors' rights.' 74 This
approach is based on the romantic notion that juvenile delinquency
proceedings should consist of a group of people-including the
juvenile's lawyer-whose responsibility is to put their arms around the
minor's shoulder to provide comfort and to work together to determine
the minor's best interests in order to plan his or her future.17 5
That is a description of the original approach to juvenile justice,
according to which legal representation of minors was considered to be
an obstacle, rather than a benefit, to the process. It is certainly not a
description of the current, nor of an ideal, system. However, courts in
Illinois seem to prefer to follow this antiquated approach. 176
guardian and continue to represent the client as a lawyer advocate. Id. at 3-4; see also Elrod,
supra note 115, at 2000-01 ("The [ABA Standards] favor the appointment of a lawyer as
advocate, rather than as a guardian ad litem or in a dual capacity."); Peters, supra note 86, at
1507-08 (noting that the guardian ad litem role in child protective proceedings "has outlived its
historical usefulness" and "should be abandoned" because it "requires lawyers to make decisions
which they are not qualified to make, and because it deprives children of the traditional
competencies of a good legal representative").
174. A national report issued just two years ago supports the conclusion that, because they
have an antiquated view of the goals of juvenile courts, many judges and other system
participants undermine attorneys' efforts to challenge the government's evidence and provide
zealous, client-centered representation, considering such advocacy an impediment to the smooth
functioning of the court. STERLING, supra note 38, at 6 (noting that judges, prosecutors, and
probation officers often view zealous juvenile defense attorneys as obstructionists). As a result,
many juvenile courts still operate in ways that deny juveniles the rights recognized by In re Gault
and its progeny. Id. at 5.
175. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ill. 1977) (stating that although a
juvenile delinquency proceeding "retains certain adversary characteristics, it is not in the usual
sense an adversary proceeding, but it is one to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for
and to promote the welfare of the minor as well as to serve the best interests of the community").
Additionally, the Mississippi Assessment Report quotes a juvenile defense attorney as saying "I
don't always listen to what [the clients] say. Mine is not the role of the typical defense attorney; I
must consider what is best for the child, and I do not take the position that I must 'get the child
off at all costs."' MISSISSIPPI ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 42. Based on the study of
the system in the state, therefore, the assessment then concludes that "[t]he expectation to serve
the child's best interest, instead of the child's expressed interest, creates an enormous amount of
pressure on defenders to be team players, at the expense of safeguarding their client's interests."
Id. at 43.
176. According to the express terms of the Juvenile Court Act, at the disposition stage of a
juvenile delinquency hearing, for example, once a minor is found delinquent, it is the trial court's
duty to "determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor or the public that he or she be
made a ward of the court, and, if he or she is to be made a ward of the court, the court shall
determine the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public." 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-705(1) (2010). By the terms of the statute itself, this is the role of the court,
not of the attorney for the delinquent minor. Enlisting the attorney for the minor to help the court
(or the prosecution, for that matter) do its job adds to the confusion of the role of the lawyer and,
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VII. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
Lawyers serve children best when they serve as advocates for the
minors' expressed interests rather than as guardians ad litem. If the
minor client's expressed wishes and lawyer's view of the minor's best
interests differ, the lawyer should seek appointment of someone else as
a guardian to protect the client's best interests.177 The lawyer may then
continue to represent the minor's position before the court.
This is the approach adopted by a number of state and local bar
associations, 178 the American Bar Association, 179 the Institute for
again, places the attorney in a position to betray his or her client. See also STERLING, supra note
38, at 5-6, 8 (explaining that without a clear understanding of the role of juvenile defense
counsel, juveniles are subjected to a pre-Gault proceeding).
177. Obviously, representing a child as an attorney by advocating for the child's express
interests does not mean the attorney cannot advise the client as to what the attorney believes to be
the best interests of the client. This is part of all lawyers' professional duty as an advisor. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 2.1 (2010) (defining the allocation of authority
between lawyer and client and imposing on lawyers a duty to exercise "independent professional
judgment" and to render "candid advice"); ILL. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 2.1
(2010) (same). When a lawyer believes the client is making a bad decision, the lawyer is
expected to help the client understand the consequences of the decision the client wants to make.
The lawyer should help the client make the decision and to do this, the lawyer must first establish
a relationship with the child, listen to the child, and, most importantly, engage the child in a
conversation about the possible approaches to the issue the child is facing. In other words,
effective advocacy requires that the attorney learn to reconcile "what the child wants with what
the decision maker may perceive to be in the child's best interests." Report of the Working Group
on the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attorney, 6 NEV. L.J. 682, 684 (2006). Once
the decision is made, unless the attorney withdraws from representation, however, the attorney's
duty is to advocate for the client's position.
178. Buckler v. Buckler, 466 S.E.2d 556, 560-61 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that if a conflict
between roles of attorney and guardian ad litem arises, a lawyer should seek appointment of new
guardian); State Bar of Arizona, Op. 86-13 (1986) (stating that if there is conflict between a
client's wishes and the lawyer-guardian's determination of client's best interests, the lawyer must
request appointment of new guardian; the lawyer may not retain role of guardian and request
appointment of new attorney, since this would present an unwaivable conflict of interest);
Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 94-29 (1994) (explaining that if a conflict exists between a
minor client's expressed wishes and the lawyer's view of minor's best interests, the lawyer
should seek the appointment of a guardian to protect the client's best interests and may then
represent the client's position before the court; if the lawyer finds doing so repugnant or
imprudent, the lawyer may seek to withdraw; the lawyer may not express opinion of merits or use
client confidences to advocate position not favored by the client); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Op.
93-6 (1993) (determining that if 13-year-old client instructs her lawyer to pursue a course of
action the lawyer believes is not in the client's best interest, then the lawyer must comply with the
instructions unless the lawyer determines the client is incapable of making reasoned decisions in
the matter; alternatively, the lawyer may seek to withdraw); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n,
Formal Op. 504 (2000) (stating that if a lawyer believes her minor client is capable of making an
informed decision, the lawyer must follow the client's instructions). Likewise, the Nebraska
Assessment Report states:
The professional rules of responsibility, relevant legal scholarship, and professional
standards and guidelines are unanimous that juvenile defense attorneys have an ethical
duty to advocate for the client's expressed interests, as opposed to the client's best
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Judicial Administration, the National Juvenile Defender Center,180 the
American Council of Chief Defenders,181 and the Children and Family
interests as determined by the attorney, the judge, the prosecutor, the probation officer,
or the client's parents.
NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 53; see also Peters, supra note 86, at 1507-08
(arguing that the guardian ad litem role in child protective proceedings should be abandoned,
among other reasons, because it deprives children of the benefit of a traditional legal
representative); Stuckey, supra note 9, at 1818 ("[L]awyers who serve as guardians ad litem
should not be asked also to perform as the child's lawyer."). But see, e.g., Clark v. Alexander,
953 P.2d 145, 153 (Wyo. 1998) (holding that the dual role of lawyer and guardian "necessitates a
modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct"); South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 98-02 (1998) (stating that a lawyer-guardian in an abuse and neglect matter
represents the guardian, not the child; thus, he may reveal confidences of the child and act in the
child's best interests even if the child contests); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. On Legal
Ethics, Op. 1729 (1999) (holding that when the specific duty of a guardian ad litem conflicts with
the ethical duties of the lawyer, the specific duty of the guardian ad litem should prevail).
179. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDARDS, supra note 172, at 3-4. According to the standards, an
attorney for a child "owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation to the child as is due an adult client." Id at 1-2. The comment to the standard
explains that this view is based on the principle that "to ensure that the child's independent voice
is heard, the child's attorney must advocate the child's articulated position." Id. at 2. If the
child's attorney determines that the child's expressed preference would be seriously injurious to
the child (as opposed to merely being contrary to the lawyer's opinion of what would be in the
child's interests), the lawyer may request appointment of a separate guardian ad litem and
continue to represent the child's expressed preference. Id. at 3-4; see also ABA Comm. on Prof I
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (stating that except in the most exigent of
circumstances, a lawyer should not act as or seek to have himself appointed guardian of a client
and, even under exigent circumstances, the lawyer should do so only on a temporary basis
making sure to take appropriate steps for the appointment of a formal guardian, other than
himself, as soon as possible). This is also the view adopted by the Uniform Representation of
Children in Abuse, Neglect and Custody Proceedings Act drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS ACT 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
rarccda/2007_final.pdf (explaining that a child's attorney should advocate for the child's
expressed interests, while providing that the child's attorney "may . . . request appointment of a
best interests advocate or a best interests attorney"). This Uniform Act mandates that the court
shall appoint either a child's attorney or a best interests attorney but leaves it to the court's
discretion to decide which of the two roles to choose. However, if a child has voiced a desire for
a lawyer, that request typically would weigh on the side of appointing a child's attorney to
provide the child with a traditional advocate. Id. at 5; see also Guggenheim, supra note 12, at
154-55 (concluding that one cannot "'represent' a young child and yet still be a 'lawyer"');
Katner, supra note 84, at 104 (supporting the adoption of the ABA standards as an enforceable
ethics code and arguing that states should abandon the current practice of appointing attorneys to
serve as guardians ad litem in dependency proceedings); Marrus, supra note 12, at 342 ("What is
important is that the child knows he or she has a say in the outcome."); Lisa A. Stanger, Conflicts
Between Attorneys and Social Workers Representing Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 1123, 1154-60 (1996) (explaining that lawyers for juveniles must serve as
"zealous advocates" and resolving the manner in which social workers can assist attorneys in this
role).
180. STERLING, supra note 38, at app. B n.1.
181. The National Juvenile Defender Center and the American Council of Chief Defenders
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Justice Center of Northwestern University School of Law, all of which
have enacted standards or published reports that conclude that juvenile
defense must be based on the client's directives. 182 This is also one of
the main conclusions reached by numerous scholars and by the two
most important national conferences on issues related to the
representation of children. 183 The first one of these explicitly concluded
that a lawyer should not serve as both a child's lawyer and guardian ad
litem, that laws authorizing the appointment of lawyers to serve as
children's guardians ad litem (or in a dual capacity as lawyer and
guardian ad litem) should be amended or eliminated, that lawyers
appointed or retained to serve a child in a legal proceeding should serve
as the child's lawyer and "should assume the obligations of a lawyer,
regardless of how the lawyer's role is labeled" and that, given the
choice, a lawyer should elect to represent the child as a lawyer rather
have articulated a set of core principles designed to assist public defender systems in reevaluating
their programs for children. The very first of these core principles upholds juveniles' right to
counsel throughout the delinquency process and recognizes the need for zealous representation to
protect children. See NAT'L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION
THROUGH PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 1 (2008), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdfl
10_Core Principles 2008.pdf (listing the ten core principles).
182. Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the view that the role of
counsel in delinquency cases is to advocate for the child and that counsel may request the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, or may elect not to oppose such an appointment, "only when
very unusual circumstances warrant such an appointment." THE SUPREME COURT OF NEV., IN
THE MATTER OF THE REVIEWING OF ISSUES CONCERNING REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 44-45 (2008), available at
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/53/.
183. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 89, at 1294 ("Laws currently authorizing the
appointment of lawyers to serve as children's guardians ad litem (or in a dual capacity as lawyer
and guardian ad litem) should therefore be amended to authorize the appointment of lawyers to
represent children as their clients."). The first of these conferences was the Fordham University
School of Law's Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, held in
1995. The second conference, the University of Nevada-Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of
Law's Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years
After Fordham, was held in 2006. The reports of the different working groups of the conferences
as well as their recommendations and other articles written for and in response to the proceedings
at the conferences are collected in the 64th volume of the Fordham Law Review and the 6th
volume of the Nevada Law Journal respectively.
The 1995 Fordham Law School conference was probably the first national meeting dedicated
exclusively to discuss ethical issues in the representation of children. The participants in the
conference sought to answer two major questions: whether children need lawyers and whether
children's lawyers should follow their clients' direction or substitute their own judgment for that
of their clients. In the end, the conference reached a strong consensus that children do need
lawyers and that children are best served when their lawyers provide representation within the
traditional, ethically-dictated expectations for an attorney-client relationship, and not when
lawyers serve as guardians ad litem or otherwise substitute their views of what is best for the
child. Bruce A. Green & Annette R. Appell, Representing Children in Families-Foreword, 6
NEV. L.J. 571, 571-72 (2006).
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than to undertake the role of a guardian ad litem. 184 The most recent of
the two conferences enthusiastically reaffirmed these conclusions.185 A
184. Hollister v. Hollister, 496 N.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding guardian
appointed under statute in custody matter functions as lawyer and therefore could not be called as
witness or cross-examined in custody proceeding); Green & Dohrn, supra note 89, at 1294
("Given the choice, a lawyer should elect to represent the child as a lawyer, not to undertake the
role of guardian ad litem."); Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, supra note 103, at 1301-02 ("A lawyer appointed or retained to serve
a child in a legal proceeding should serve as the child's lawyer."); see also Henning, supra note 7,
at 255-56 (demonstrating that the weight of academic opinion since the early 1980s has been that
the appropriate role of counsel in delinquency cases was that of an expressed-interest advocate);
Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 260 (1995) ("[T]he law supports a modem concept of zealous child
advocacy."); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 349
(1993) ("As a general rule, the attorney [appointed to represent a child] should advocate the
wishes of the child-even if the attorney questions the correctness of the child's view."); Wu,
supra note 124, at 1859 (citing Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the
Child?, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67, 74 (1995)) (asserting that the academic literature
reveals a growing consensus that the proper role of an attorney for a child is to represent the
client's wishes [as opposed to the attorney's conception of the minor's best interests] consistent
with the minor's age and cognitive ability); Angela D. Lurie, Note, Representing the Child-
Client: Kids Are People Too, An Analysis of the Role of Legal Counsel to a Minor, 11 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 205, 207 (1993) ("[T]he only ethically proper role for an attorney assigned to a
mature child as a law guardian or legal counsel is that of an advocate for the child's expressed
wishes."); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel
for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 681-82 (1987) (arguing that standards of professional
responsibility should be extended to provide guidance to attorneys who represent children and
noting that such action would "confine the attorney to the traditional role as [the child's] agent").
185. The more recent conference, held at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas William S.
Boyd School of Law in 2006, with the purpose to continue the discussion of the issues where the
Fordham conference left off, reached similar conclusions. Green & Appell, supra note 183, at
571-72. It concluded that children still need lawyers to serve as lawyers and that lawyers need to
respect their young clients' autonomy so that they can participate fully in their representation and
in the legal process. Report of the Working Group on the Best Interests of the Child and the Role
of the Attorney, supra note 177, at 682-83 (arguing that a lawyer appointed or retained to
represent a child in a legal proceeding should serve as the child's lawyer, regardless of how the
lawyer's role is labeled or the age of the child). The recommendations caution lawyers not to
make assumptions about what children want and need and about how best to serve children based
on biases and stereotypes. Id. at 684. As explained in the foreword to the conference
recommendations and other articles generated for and in response to the conference, the
recommendations "go far beyond those developed at Fordham a decade earlier. But they also
resoundingly reaffirm the earlier recommendations." Green & Appell, supra note 183, at 584. In
particular, they reaffirm the conclusion that children's lawyers should serve consistently with the
norms governing the attorney-client relationship and that lawyers should advocate for their
clients' expressed objectives. Green & Appell, supra note 183, at 584; see also id. at 684 ("[The
UNLV Recommendations] reaffirm[] that children need lawyers in a variety of contexts not
limited to delinquency and dependency cases, and further, that children's lawyers should serve
consistently with the norms governing the attorney-client relationship."); Erik Pitchal, Buzz in the
Brain and Humility in the Heart: Doing it all, Without Doing Too Much, On Behalf of Children, 6
NEV. L.J. 1350, 1358-61 (2006) (providing a ringing reaffirmation of the Fordham Conference
Recommendations while also adding significant new findings and determinations based on
experiences developed in the intervening ten years since that first landmark gathering); Report of
the Working Group on the Best Interests of the Child and The Role of the Attorney, supra note
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conference dedicated to the discussion of similar issues in Illinois also
reached the same conclusions.186
Accordingly, the Juvenile Delinquency Guidelines of the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court conclude that an attorney for a
minor in a delinquency proceeding must be "an advocate, zealously
asserting the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system."1 87 This is so because, as explained in an assessment study of
the juvenile justice system in-the state of West Virginia, "[a]lthough the
primary goal of a juvenile court case is the successful rehabilitation of
an adjudicated child . . . , the method to reach that goal is an adversarial
process that relies on the prosecution's proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and the defense's zealous protection of a child's due
process rights."' 88
177, at 682-83 (reaffirming the Fordham commitment to client-directed representation); Report
of the Working Group on the Role of the Family, 6 NEV. L.J. 616, 621 (2006) (reaffirming the
general principle of the Fordham Conference that lawyers should not substitute their own
judgment of what is best for children for the child' wishes).
186. The Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children in Illinois was
held in 1998 in the Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Two of the specific
recommendations of this conference were that "[in all proceedings involving children, the
attorney for the child should not function in more than one role" and that "[c]ounsel in
delinquency proceedings should assume the role of the traditional attorney when representing the
client." Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children in Illinois, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 377, 382 (1998).
187. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
GUIDELINES, IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 30 (2005). The
same is true for abuse and neglect cases according to the standards adopted by the Family Section
of the American Bar Association. See Elrod, supra note 115, at 2007 (asserting that if a lawyer is
appointed as guardian ad litem or in a dual capacity and a conflict arises, then the lawyer must act
as the child's attorney).
188. PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, WEST VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT 56
(2010) [hereinafter WEST VIRGINIA ASSESSMENT REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/
pdflWest Virginia _Assessment.pdf. The assessment reports in the states of Montana, Nebraska,
Washington, and South Carolina also express the same idea. See MONTANA ASSESSMENT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (recommending that attorneys should "[e]nsure zealous advocacy for
the expressed interest of the child, rather than the best interest"). In addition, the Nebraska
Assessment Report concluded:
The Nebraska Supreme Court . . . should clarify the ethical and role confusion that
characterizes juvenile court practice . . .. Consistent with the [ABA's] Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Institute for Judicial Administration/ABA Juvenile Justice
Standards, and the National Coalition of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
Delinquency Court Guidelines, the Commission on Children in the Courts should take
the position that youth in law violation proceedings must be represented by defense
attorneys who advocate for the clients' stated interest and protect their clients' due
process rights, and acknowledge that juvenile courts are adversarial fora in which
zealous advocacy is expected and not penalized.
NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at viii; see also SOUTH CAROLINA ASSESSMENT
REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 ("The juvenile defender's role, as that of an adult defender, is to
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Moreover, the standards of the American Bar Association and the,
Institute for Judicial Administration1 89 specifically state that "the
lawyer's principal duty is the representation of the client's legitimate
interests" and that "[c]ounsel for the respondent in a delinquency ...
proceeding should ordinarily be bound by the client's definition of his
or her interests."1 90 Similarly, the standards of the National Juvenile
Defender Center state that the duty of the juvenile defense counsel is to:
[A]dvocat[e] for the client's expressed interests, not the client's "best
interest" as determined by counsel, the client's parents or guardian, the
probation officer, the prosecutor, or the judge. With respect to the
duty of loyalty owed to the client, the juvenile delinquency attorney-
client relationship mirrors the adult criminal attorney-client
relationship. 191
Finally, the recommendations of the report by the Children and
Family Justice Center of Northwestern University School of Law and
the National Juvenile Defender Center concludes that all juvenile
defense attorneys should "[r]epresent the expressed interest of their
clients as opposed to what the defense attorney believes to be in the
'best interest' of the child"192 because, in part:
While it is understandable to want to do what is in the best interest of
the child, that is the responsibility of the court, not the juvenile
defense attorney. If a lawyer concludes that a child is not capable of
forming and maintaining a meaningful lawyer-client relationship, a
guardian should be appointed to assist with decision making. 193
In sum, the duties of an attorney for a minor client are fundamentally
different than those of a guardian ad litem.194 They are so different, in
represent the stated interests of the young client."); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra
note 7, at 22 ("[I]t is not the defense attorney's role to decide what is in the best interest of the
child-client.. . . [An attorney should] not [be] a guardian to the child, nor an advisor to the court,
nor in the role of protector of the community.").
189. The Illinois Assessment Report states:
Beginning in 1971, and continuing over a ten-year period, the Institute for Judicial
Administration and the American Bar Association collaborated to produce 23 volumes
of comprehensive juvenile justice standards. The final standards, adopted by the ABA
in 1982, were designed to establish a juvenile justice system of lasting excellence that
would not fluctuate in response to transitory headlines or controversies.
ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (footnote omitted).
190. AM. BAR ASS'N & INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., supra note 12, § 3.1.
191. STERLING, supra note 38, at 7; see also ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at
111 ("At every stage of court proceedings, a defender is ethically bound to advocate for the
legitimate interests and goals expressed by the child.").
192. ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 77-78.
193. Id. at 74 (footnote omitted).
194. Katner, supra note 84, at 103 (arguing that the guardian ad litem role is inconsistent with
the traditional functions of an attorney representing a client); Ross, supra note 86, at 1615
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fact, that attempting to serve as an attorney and a guardian at the same
time in a delinquency proceeding eliminates the effectiveness of the
attorney's role as an attorney and essentially makes it impossible for the
attorney to provide the type of effective assistance of counsel that is
guaranteed by the Constitution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As expressed by the organizers of the Fordham University School of
Law's Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, "improving professional representation will matter to the lives
of children" because a lot is at stake in delinquency proceedings and
because "[w]hat happens in court shapes children's futures."195
For this reason, and because individuals whose interests are at stake
in delinquency proceedings have the right to effective legal assistance,
the recommendations and adopted standards of numerous organizations,
scholars, commentators, and conferences are in agreement that it is
imperative to abandon the approach to juvenile justice that allows the
possibility of representation by an attorney who, in reality, acts as a
guardian ad litem.196 To achieve this goal, the ambiguity in Illinois law
and practice concerning the role of defense counsel in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding must be eliminated.
In delinquency proceedings, the difference between attorneys and
guardians ad litem is critical and the two roles should never be
combined or confused. To the extent that this is what is happening now
across Illinois, attorneys are attempting to do the impossible. In order
to fulfill one role they must fail at the other. Remedying this problem is
a critical element in the effort to improve the quality of juvenile justice
in Illinois and necessary to return the state to the leadership position it
assumed in 1899. Thankfully, the problem can be avoided simply by
making sure that the appointed guardian ad litem is someone other than
the minor's lawyer, thus allowing the lawyer to fulfill his or her role as
an advocate and preserving and protecting the minor's right to counsel.
There should be no doubt that minors will benefit from the adoption
of a system that requires that the roles of attorney and guardian be
performed by different individuals. 197  There are many reasons that
(concluding that differences in the roles of attorney and guardian ad litem are stark).
195. Green & Dohrn, supra note 89, at 1284.
196. WEST VIRGINIA ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 188, at 23, 56 (stating that even
though "[t]he purpose of the West Virginia youth code is faithful to the traditional rehabilitative
animus of juvenile delinquency court, as evidenced by its specificity and family-centered
approach," the way to reach that goal is an adversarial process that relies on zealous advocacy).
197. STERLING, supra note 38, at 6-7. Based on the decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-
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support this conclusion. First, such a system would reduce the danger
of having lawyers interjecting their personal opinions and values into
the proceedings.198  Second, it would promote the same type of
performance from all lawyers, regardless of who happens to represent
the minors in any given case.199 Third, it would place the lawyers in the
best position to perform the role for which lawyers are best trained.200
Fourth, children will be assured that the state will comply with its duty
to protect their right to counsel. Fifth, if the child needs a guardian, he
or she will get the benefit of one in addition to the benefit of an
attorney. Sixth, the best interests of the child are better served if the
child's attorney can work together with a guardian who is not an
attorney and who is trained to operate as a guardian.201 Also, children
will benefit from being able to participate in their own defense with full
confidence that their attorney will not disclose their confidences and
will be committed to advocating their preferences. Finally, by not
having the attorney for the child act as a guardian, the state will be
forced to do its own investigation in order to prove its case against the
minor beyond a reasonable doubt.202 The result will be a system that
protects the rights and the interests of minors more efficiently.
31 (1967), "the juvenile defense attorney is a critical check on the power of the state as it imperils
the client's liberty interests." STERLING, supra note 38, at 6. "Defenders are not obstructionists;
they protect the child's constitutional rights." Id. at 6-7. For a response to those who argue that
it is not in the minors' best interest to think of delinquency proceedings are adversarial, see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 751, 751
(2011) (arguing that "advocacy in our legal system's litigation process" is "ethically positive" and
is "pivotal to fair and effective dispute resolution").
198. Guggenheim, supra note 170, at 312-13.
199. Id. at 313.
200. Id
201. For a discussion of this topic, see Daniella Levine, To Assert Children 's Legal Rights or
Promote Children's Needs: How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2032-33
(1996) (arguing for a hybrid model of representation and suggesting that "lawyers working alone
on behalf of children are not enough"); see also Katner, supra note 84, at 103 (determining what
is in a child's best interest creates some serious ethical problems for an attorney).
202. STERLING, supra note 38, at 8, 16 (arguing that a client-centered model of advocacy
allows juvenile defense counsel to enhance immeasurably the fundamental fairness of the system;
given that minors are owed due process under constitutional principles, juvenile defense counsel
ensures fairness in the courtroom by litigating the case vigorously consistent with the
presumption of innocence, regardless of counsel's opinion concerning either guilt or innocence or
the client's need for social, educational, and other services).
